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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, ) SUPREMECOURTNO. 43105 
) 
Deceased. ) 






JUDD LANHAM, ) 
Respondent ) 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Gem. 
Attorney for Appellant 
****************** 
Patrick J. Geile 
Matthew G. Bennett 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC 
953 S. Industry Way 
PO Box 10 
Meridian, ID 83680 
HONORABLE D. DUFF MCKEE 
District Judge 
Attorney for Respondent 
******************** 
Nancy L. Callahan 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Attorney at Law 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
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Date: 5/21/2015 
Time: 02:09 PM 
Page 1 of 4 
Third Judicial District Court - Gem County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0000886 Current Judge: D. Duff McKee 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Gordon Thomas Lanham Deceased 
User: ORIBIO 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Gordon Thomas Lanham Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
12/20/2013 NCIE FLOWERS New Case Filed - Informal Estate Tyler D. Smith 
FLOWERS Filing: A6 - Application for informal probate Paid Tyler D. Smith 
by: Callahan, Nancy L (attorney for Lanham, Judd 
Max) Receipt number: 0005916 Dated: 
12/20/2013 Amount: $96.00 (Check) For: 
Lanham, Judd Max {other party) 
MISC FLOWERS Accpetance of Appointment As Personal Tyler D. Smith 
Representative 
12/27/2013 QUENZER Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Tyler D. Smith 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Nancy Callahan Receipt number: 0005961 
Dated: 12/27/2013 Amount: $2.00 {Cash) 
MISC QUENZER Statement of Informal Probate of Will and Tyler D. Smith 
Informal Appointment of Personal Representative 
LTST QUENZER Letters Of Testamentary Tyler D. Smith 
MISC QUENZER Information to Heirs and Devisees Tyler D. Smith 
1/8/2014 MISC ORIBIO Application to Attest Personal Representative for Tyler D. Smith 
This Estate 
1/10/2014 ORIBIO Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Tyler D. Smith 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: William 
Lee Receipt number: 0000142 Dated: 1/10/2014 
Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: Lanham, Gordon 
Thomas (subject) 
1/13/2014 HRSC FLOWERS Hearing Scheduled {Probate 01/21/2014 04:00 Tyler D. Smith 
PM) petition of removal of personal 
representative 
AFFD FLOWERS Affidavit Of Petitioner In Support Of Petition To Tyler D. Smith 
Remove Personal Representate, Etc 
NOTC FLOWERS Notice Of Hearing On Petition To Remove Tyler D. Smith 
Personal Representative, Etc.And Request To 
Shorten Time 
1/16/2014 MISC ORIBIO Creditor's Claim Tyler D. Smith 
1/17/2014 ORDR DODSON Order on Request to Shorten Time Tyler D. Smith 
NOTC QUENZER Notice of Intent to Cross-Examine and to Tyler D. Smith 
Introduce Evidence 
1/21/2014 HRHD DODSON Hearing result for Probate scheduled on Tyler D. Smith 
01/21/2014 04:00 PM: Hearing Held petition of 
removal of personal representative, Mr Lee to file 
notice 
HRSC DODSON Hearing Scheduled (Civil Court Trial 04/02/2014 Tyler D. Smith 
09:00AM) 
2/4/2014 AFFD CONKLIN Affidavit of Publication Tyler D. Smith 
3/11/2014 MISC ORIBIO Final Distribution Receipt and Release Tyler D. Smith 
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Page 2 of 4 
Third Judicial District Court - Gem County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0000886 Current Judge: D. Duff McKee 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Gordon Thomas Lanham Deceased 
User: ORIBIO 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Gordon Thomas Lanham Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
3/21/2014 HRSC DODSON Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/03/2014 Tyler D. Smith 
11 :00 AM) to restrain personal 
representative--paperwork to follow 
3/24/2014 NOTC ORIBIO Notice of Hearing Tyler D. Smith 
PETN DODSON Petition for Order Removing Personal Tyler D. Smith 
Representative, Construing Will, and Determining 
Heirs 
PETN DODSON Petition for Order Restraining Personal Tyler D. Smith 
Representative 
3/28/2014 AFFD FLOWERS Affidavit Of Judd Lanham Personal Tyler D. Smith 
Representative 
NOTC FLOWERS Notice Of Service Tyler D. Smith 
3/31/2014 NOTC FLOWERS Notice Of Withdrawal Of Petition For Removal Of Tyler D. Smith 
Personal Representative And For Declaration Of 
Intestacy And Other Relief 
4/2/2014 HRHD ORIBIO Hearing result for Civil Court Trial scheduled on Tyler D. Smith 
04/02/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
MISC DODSON Inventory Tyler D. Smith 
4/3/2014 HRHD DODSON Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on Tyler D. Smith 
04/03/2014 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held to restrain 
personal representative--paperwork to follow 
4/8/2014 MOTN QUENZER Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Tyler D. Smith 
AFFD QUENZER Affidavit for Attorney's Fees and Costs Tyler D. Smith 
MEMO QUENZER Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney's Tyler D. Smith 
Fees and Costs 
4/11/2014 MISC CONKLIN Objection to Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Tyler D. Smith 
4/23/2014 HRSC DODSON Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 06/09/2014 Jayme B Sullivan 
09:00 AM) Motion for Summary Judgment 
MOTN DODSON Motion for Summary Judgment Tyler D. Smith 
MEMO DODSON Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Tyler D. Smith 
Judgment 
4/24/2014 NOHR DODSON Notice of Hearing Tyler D. Smith 
MISC DODSON Demand for Bond Tyler D. Smith 
4/29/2014 NOHR DODSON Amended Notice of Hearing Tyler D. Smith 
CONT DODSON Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on Jayme B Sullivan 
06/09/2014 09:00 AM: Continued Motion for 
Summary Judgment--paperwork to follow from 
Mr. Fleanor 
HRSC DODSON Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 06/10/2014 Tyler D. Smith 
11:00 AM) 
5/23/2014 MOTN DODSON Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion Tyler D. Smith 
to Dismiss 
MEMO DODSON Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Tyler D. Smith 
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss 
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Third Judicial District Court - Gem County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0000886 Current Judge: D. Duff McKee 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Gordon Thomas Lanham Deceased 
User: ORIBIO 






































































Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on Tyler D. Smith 
06/10/201411:00AM: Hearing Held for 
Summary Judgment 
Motion to Reconsideration Tyler D. Smith 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Tyler D. Smith 
Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
Judgment Tyler D. Smith 
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Tyler D. Smith 
Affidavit in Support of Motion of Attorney's Fees Tyler D. Smith 
and Costs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney's Tyler D. Smith 
Fees and Costs 
Objection to Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Tyler D. Smith 
Filing: L2 - Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Tyler D. Smith 
Court Paid by: Fleenor, Douglas E (attorney for 
Lanham, Thomas Everrett) Receipt number: 
0003820 Dated: 8/13/2014 Amount: $81.00 
(Check) For: Lanham, Thomas Everrett (other 
party) 
Scheduling Order on Appeal District Court Clerks 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/08/2014 Tyler D. Smith 
01 :45 PM) Attorney's fees 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 
10/08/2014 01 :45 PM: Hearing Held Attorney's 
fees 
Lodged Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing 
Stipulation For Substitution Of Counsel 
Appellant's Brief 
Request for Oral Argument 
District Court Clerks 
Tyler D. Smith 
District Court Clerks 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
Motion to Extend Time for Filing Respondent's D. Duff McKee 
Brief and Affidavit in Support 
Order on Respondent's Motion to Extend Time for D. Duff McKee 
Filing Respondent's Brief 
Motion To Dismiss Appeal As Untimely Filed And D. Duff McKee 
Memorandum In Support Motion For Fees and 
Costs On Appeal 
Response to Motion to Dismiss 
Respondents Reply Re: Dismissal of Appeal 
Second Motion for Extension of Time for Filing 
Respondent's Brief and Affidavit in Support 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
Order on Respondents Second Motion to Extend D. Duff McKee 
Time for Filing Brief 
5
Date: 5/21/2015 
Time: 02:09 PM 
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Third Judicial District Court - Gem County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0000886 Current Judge: D. Duff McKee 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Gordon Thomas Lanham Deceased 
User: ORIBIO 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Gordon Thomas Lanham Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
2/10/2015 ORDR CONKLIN Order Dismissing Appeal D. Duff McKee 
2/12/2015 MEMO CONKLIN Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees D. Duff McKee 
AFFD CONKLIN Affidavit for Attorneys Fees and Costs D. Duff McKee 
2/19/2015 MEMO CONKLIN Memorandum Decision on Personal Tyler D. Smith 
Representative's Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs 
2/20/2015 MISC CONKLIN Objection to Memorandum of Costs and D. Duff McKee 
Attorneys Fees 
3/23/2015 CONKLIN Filing: L2 - Appeal, Magistrate Division to District District Court Clerks 
Court Paid by: Mattew Bennett\foley freeman 
Receipt number: 0001209 Dated: 3/23/2015 
Amount: $81.00 {Credit card) For: Lanham, 
Thomas Everrett (other party) 
CONKLIN Filing: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Mattew District Court Clerks 
Bennett\foley freeman Receipt number: 0001209 
Dated: 3/23/2015 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
For: Lanham, Thomas Everrett ( other party) 
CONKLIN Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to District Court Clerks 
Supreme Court Paid by: Matthew Bennett/Foley 
Freeman Receipt number: 0001210 Dated: 
3/23/2015 Amount: $129.00 (Credit card) For: 
Lanham, Thomas Everrett (other party) 
CONKLIN Filing: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Matthew District Court Clerks 
Bennett/Foley Freeman Receipt number: 
0001210 Dated: 3/23/2015 Amount: $3.00 
(Credit card) For: Lanham, Thomas Everrett 
( other party) 
3/24/2015 ORDR CONKLIN Order on Respondent's Request for Attorney D. Duff McKee 
Fees and Costs 
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Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES Of NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
[F ~ lL ~ ID)~~ 
DEC 2 0 2013 
~y~UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 










CASE NO. CV2013- i~ lR 
APPLICATION FOR 
INFORMAL PROBATE Of 
WILL AND INFORMAL 
APPOINTMENT OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
Fee Category: A (6) 
Fee: $96.00 
APPLICANT, JUDD MAX LANHAM, REPRESENTS TO THE 
MAGISTRATE THAT: 
1. Applicant's interest in this matter is that of cousin and devisee and 
Applicant is the nominee of the Decedent to serve as the Executor named 
under Decedent's Will. 
2. The Decedent, GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, died on December 5, 
2013 at the age of approximately 69 years. 
3. Venue is proper because at the time of death the Decedent resided in 
and owned property in this County. 
Application for Informal Probate of Will and 
Informal Appointment of Personal Representative - Page 1 ORIGINAL 
7
are: 
4. The time limit for informal appointment has not expired. 
5. The names and addresses of the heirs and devisees of the Decedent 
Keith Colby Lanham 
3421 Butte Road 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Thomas Everett Lanham 
17777 Sweet/ Ola Hwy 
Ola, Idaho 83657-5018 
Kathy Gillihan 
10041 DeWitt 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Linda Louise Andrews Lanham 
9509 Missouri Ave 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Judd Max Lanham 
1504 N. McKinney 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
6. No Personal Representative has been appointed in this State or 
elsewhere. 
7. Applicant has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice 
of any probate or appointment proceeding concerning the Decedent that may 
have been filed in this State or elsewhere. 
8. The original of the Decedent's Last Will and Testament dated 
February 19, 2011, accompanies this Application. 
9. Applicant believes that the Will, which is the subject of this 
Application, was validly executed. 
Application for Informal Probate of Will and 
Informal Appointment of Personal Representative - Page 2 
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10. Having exercised reasonable diligence, Applicant is unaware of any 
instrument revoking the Will which is the subject of this Application and 
believes that such is the Decedent's last Will. 
11. The status in which such person seeks appointment is the person 
nominated by the Decedent as his personal representative. 
12. Bond is not required. 
13. The Applicant, being duly sworn, says that the Applicant has read 
the Application and that the facts set forth therein are accurate and complete 
to the best of Applicant's knowledge and belief. 
WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT: 
1. The Decedent's Last Will and Testament dated February 19, 2011, be 
informally probated. 
2. That JUDD MAX LANHAM be informally appointed Personal 
Representative of the Decedent, to act without bond. 
3. Upon qualification and acceptance, Letters Testamentary be issued. 
DATED this /tf day of December 2013. 
I 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b 
Notary 
Residin 
(i . ;1 ,~~ v7 1 
.• y<,dY-t! ~( f:=~ 
lUDD MAX LANHAM, Applicant 
1504 N. McKinney 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
My Commission Expires: .... ';l_,_.-.-~------
Application for Informal Probate of Will and 
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. ". 
Last Will and Testament 
My name is Gordon Thomas Lanham at 3555 Butte Road, Emmett, Idaho 83617. 
My birthday is . As of sound mind, I am recording my Last Will and 
Testament. This is November 16, 2010. 
November 18, Thursday, 2010: I had a wife and two sons and grandsons and a 
couple of great grandsons and great granddaughters and I want to make this clear what I 
am going to do for my estate. I am going to make my friend and cousin Judd Max 
Lanham executor to my estate and give him Power of Attorney over all my personal and 
real property. I am also going to clear what I am going to leave my son Thomas Everett 
Lanham and Keith Colby Lanham and my grandchildren. 
I have two sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby Lanham. I want to 
state in my Will what they receive. I have 6 living grandsons and two great 
grandchildren ... one boy and one girL. . I have a ranch with 120 
acres. I have two separate deeds. I have $50,000 mortgage on the deed on the house and 
34 acres to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. I have some equipment, some personal 
items, some furniture and some personal effects according. I have a little bit of livestock, 
a horse and some cattle. 
This is another day ... it is November 19th and I want to state in here that the 
executor of my Will is Judd Max Lanham and I am giving his a Power of Attorney for 
full control now and even after I am dead. I want him to be able to distribute my property 
and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will try and put all the wording 
about the personal effects. I also have a 4 7-acre of property in Big Creek Idaho, Valley 
county and I will try to describe about how I want that administered, etc. I am gonna stop 
now. 
This is a new day. It's the 29th November, 2010. Thanksgiving is over and I just 
wanted to add to this program that my son, Thomas Everett Lanham, 48 years old, has 
already been given all he needs to have and that I am going to leave $1 more dollar 
against whatever is legal to him and then he is going to be on his own. As far as my son, 
Keith Colby Lanham, he is currently in jail. I will have to work on what I am going to do 
with the police process of what he can own, etc. What comes under his record. Anyway, 
that is all for now and I will start again later. 
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It's a new day and it's snowing. It's 1st December 2010. It's the first snow out 
back. I am not really looking forward to it ... but anyway, I want to go on about my son, 
Keith Colby Lanham and his wife, Amy Lanham, that I am going to try to write it down 
or leave it in this recording that... what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my 
estate I don't want him to be able to sell and profit off of his alcoholism or drugs ever 
since his car wreck he has been on pain pills and ever since his son rode in the rodeos and 
got himself into a domestic violence case and went to prison, now his father is in the 
same way. Anyway, I will going on in the next session about my grandchildren, his 
children will not receive anything either. I am not trying to be mean but I am still trying 
to deal with all the drugs and alcohol. I have drunk for 45 years and I know that the 
effects of alcohol are mind altering and the way that they think now is not good. 
Anyway, I will go for another session tomorrow. It's is snowing out and it gonna be a 
beautiful winter and Christmas. 
It's Thursday afternoon on the 9th December, 2010: All is well. I was just going 
to record in here that I need to do a lot of thinking about what I am going to do with my 
personal effects and property. I sold my steer and heifer at the sale and my grandson 
came down with tonsillitis so I am gonna have to baby sit him for a while it looks like. 
Anyway, I wanted to comment on all the furniture in this house. Some of it belongs to 
me and some of it belongs to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. The old Pine couch and 
two chairs furniture, dresser with a mirror and a stand up dresser in the bedroom belongs 
to her and a comer cabinet belongs to her and an old antique rocking chair she got from 
Nebraska belongs to her. The rest of the furniture was given to me by my Mother and my 
Father and the comer cabinet in the foyer, this big room out here where the heating stove 
is belongs to Linda or her son Todd and my Mother gave me a lot of this stuff but I 
haven't decided where to disperse of it lately. The old antique coffee grinder, lamp and 
radio ... it's an antique radio that belongs to Linda but the lamp belongs to me and my 
Locust coffee table came from Glenn's Ferry - King Hill, Idaho belongs to me. The 
rungs and all the antique Navajo Indian rugs belong to me and I am gonna try and 
disburse of some of those before my passing. But anyway this is another day and another 
time. Catch ya later ... bye 
Its Sunday Morning, 12th December, 2010: The neighbor just came over and put 
some wood in for me I the stove .. .its foggy and pretty cold up here. I don't know what it 
12
.. ,'"''. 
is in the valley but ... anyway, I wanted to add to the situation that a lot of the antiques 
that I have to be clarified as personal property and lots of them belonged to my ... that my 
mother gave me, belonged to my sister Kathy and some of her family and she can 
disburse of them with help from my cousin Judd. The plates, the china plates, the coffee 
grinding machine, the tables and the sewing machines and the old antique kitchen stove 
and the old antique oak tables and etc., she can decide where she wants them to go or 
whatever. And I want ... there is all kinds of books, etc. in the living room 
cabinet .... some of those belong to Lizzy's mother and lots of them belonged to my Dad 
and they were all given to me as gifts and they can sort thru some of that stuff however 
they want. There is antique table and chairs, small set that was my Mother's. There is an 
antique rocker; I might have mentioned that, it belongs to Lizzy. There is an antique 
radio. And as far as my guns are concerned I am gonna have to try and decide on how 
that goes ... there is a wooden bed in the big bedroom that my Dad had built at Cabin 
Creek, that belongs to my son, Keith. And the smaller one in the other bedroom belongs 
to my son, Tom, which my Dad built. Anyway, there is also some sand painting that 
belongs to Lizzy and I gotta $3,000 sheep head that Judd can hang up in his cabin ifhe 
wants to. And, there is all kinds of stuff that I'll discuss with him. But anyway, there is 
all kinds of stuff in my safe that will be his to disperse of how ever he wants. Catch ya 
later .... bye. 
Well, it's the shortest day of the year tomorrow ... it snowed 5 or 6 inches the last 
couple of days. I haven't talked into this very much. I just been doing a lot of thinking 
and I want to think about that 47 acres in Big Creek, Idaho, Plot 35. I am going to 
administer Yz to one person and Yz to another. I am going to go over this message about 
my stuff that is in this safe. There is a whole bunch of pictures in there of all this 
furniture and household goods for the insurance companies and taxes and etc. I have 
always paid up. I owe $1,500 on that Linda Louise Andrews mortgage for the year 2010. 
She is supposed to send me a receipt that it is paid up from 2006 thru 2010. When I get 
that I'll put that in the safe. There is some cashiers checks, cash, and coins, in that safe. 
And an antique gun that is worth a lot of money ... a 40-60 Winchester and a brand new 
replica. There is a 308 lever action rifle. There will be a22 marlin lever action rifle. A 
30-30, and old browning 5 shot automatic 12 gauge and there is about a $6,000 1933 
13
browning over and under silver engraved with a 4 digit serial number 9929. Anyway, it's 
the 19th day of December 20 I 0. 
It's a New Year ... this is January 7, 2011: My uncle John died Tuesday, my Dad 
has been dead for 30 years. Anyway, I just wanted to say that I got a receipt in the mail 
for paying all the money owed on my $50,000 mortgage thru 2010. It is now 2:00 Friday 
the 7th and I wanted to mention about my guns. I wanted to mention that they can be sold 
for enough money to pay part of the mortgage off and what have you. I have antique 6 or 
8 thousand dollar 1933 browning double trigger, silver engraved, over and under with a 4 
digit serial number. I also have an old 308 60 year old rifle with a scope. I have a 
antique 40-60 Winchester and a new replica copy. I have a browning 5 shot automatic 
that's a 1952 model. I have a 375 Hand H magnum that belonged to my Father. I have a 
30-30 rifle. I also have a 454 Rueger Krusel pistol. I have a 22 magnum pistol. I have a 
380 automatic pistol and I have a antique 40-60 Winchester that came from Vinegar 
Ridge in the back country off of Cabin Creek that could be worth as much as 8 or I 0 
thousand dollars. 
(The above was transcribed on 1-19-11 by Rebecca Clift.) 
I want to state in here again that the executor of my Will is Judd 
Max Lanham and I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even 
14
after I am dead. I want him to be able to distribute my pro~ fd my perso~ j1f~ ' 
as stated in my Last Will and Testament. ~ c\ tJ""\-- r""'\v 6 \IJL{f S> ~. e--
STATEMENT OF WITNESSES 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of Idaho that the person who 
signed or acknowledged this document is personally known to me ( or proved to me on 
the basis of convincing evidence) to be the principal, that the principal signed or 
acknowledged this Last Will and Testament in my presence, that the principal appears to 
be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue influence, that I am not the person 
appointed as executor by this document,. 
signature: ~C./J~~=ld~ c<- wc.A,l_ 
,_,-de,€ 
Print name{:,Aflldsn°,Je (!S,.Ut r J Print Name: l,.., ( l.. LI J4 11" ,4 . w /.J /.. L Ii C -e 
Date: d. - J 9: - / / 
Address: tOt/u C {trr,€;:~l)Jt)f!.- Address: / 0 '-/0 eAm el..o t: Df< 
OD'i'Se, X-"D ?,?;7bi./ g 01.:5 e .J:O. 8 3,01{ 
I further declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of Idaho that I am not 
related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, and, to the best of my knowledge, 
I am not entitled to any part of the estate of the principal upon the death of the principal 
under a will n w existing or by operation oflaw. 
J i .. (\,(\ . 
Signature. ~ L Signature: {.u:jj.;.__. u . /p~ 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada) 
On this l'i, t:J...i day of~ , 2011, before me personally 
appeared Gordon Thomas Lanham to me known ( or proved to me on basis of satisfactory 
evidence) to be the person whose name is subscribed to this instrument, and 
acknowledged that he/she executed it. I declare under penalty of perjury that the person 
w~~e is subscribed to this instrument appears to be of sound mind and under no 
/1.f uress, aud or undue influ~nce. c ... 1/0-~ -1/ •• J· (d () /J-f -~ L  ~-~-- REBECCA J. CLIFT 
Notary Public for Idaho NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Eagle, Idaho I STATE OF IDAHO 
My Commission Expires: 1..9., l b,, ;loJ & 
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NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
ROLF M. KEHNE 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
1~ 1 ~k E QM. 
DEC 2 7 2013 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 








) _________ ) 
CASE NO. CV2013-~3Cf 
STATEMENT OF INFORMAL 
PROBATE OF WILL AND 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT 
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTAnVE 
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Application for Informal Probate of 
Will and Informal Appointment of Personal Representative filed by JUDD 
MAX LANHAM, the Court finds that: 
1. The Application is complete; 
2. Applicant has made oath or affirmation that the statements 
contained in the Application are true to the best of Applicant's 
knowledge and belief; 
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3. Applicant appears from the Application to be an interested 
person as defined by the Idaho Uniform Probate Code; 
4. The Decedent died on December 5, 2013, at the age of 69 
years. 
5. On the basis of the statements in the Application, venue is 
proper. 
6. The original, duly executed and apparently un-revoked Last Will 
and Testament of the Decedent, dated the 19th day of February 
2011, is in the Court's possession. 
7. Any required notice has been given or waived. 
8. On the basis of the statements in the Application, the Will to 
which the Application relates is not part of a known series of 
testamentary instruments. 
9. On the basis of the statements in the Application: 
(a) No personal representative has been appointed in this 
state or elsewhere; 
(b) Applicant is the nominee of the Decedent as domiciliary 
personal representative. 
10. On the basis of the statements in the Application, neither the 
Will to which the Application relates nor any other Will of the 
Decedent has been the subject of a previous probate order in 
this state. 
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11. It appears from the Application that the time limit for informal 
probate and appointment has not expired. 
12. Based on the statements in the Application, the person whose 
appointment as personal representative is sought is qualified to 
act as personal representative and has priority entitling said 
person to the appointment. 
13. Bond is not required. 
14. The applicable time period within which no action can be taken 
on an application for informal probate and appointment has 
elapsed. 
THEREFORE: 
1. The Last Will and Testament of the Decedent, dated February 19, 
2011, is hereby informally probated. 
2. JUDD MAX LANHAM is hereby appointed Personal Representative 
of the estate of the Decedent, to act without bond. 
3. Upon qualification and acceptance, Letters Testamentary shall be 
issued. 
4. Notice shall be given in accordance with I.C. 15-3-705. 
STATEMENT OF INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND INFORMAL 
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Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
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CASE NO. CV2013-~ol(> 
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY 
JUDD MAX LANHAM was duly appointed and qualified as the 
General Personal Representative of the estate of the above named 
decedent by the Court with all authority pertaining thereto. 
Administration of the estate is unsupervised. 
These letters are issued to evidence the appointment, qualification, and 
authority of the said personal representative. rli. 
WITNESS, my signature and the Seal of this Court, this '9..-tf, day 
of December 2013. 




WILLIAM F. LEE 
ISBN 1509 
Attorney at Law 
629 E. Main Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
(208) 365-5367 
Attorney for Petitioner Keith C. Lanham 
if :JI: ~ E 9..i 
JAN 1 01~ 
.CLERK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 














CASE NO. CV 2013-886 
PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATNE 
AND FOR DECLARATION OF 
INTESTACY AND OTHER RELIEF 
Fee Category: I.I. 
Fee: $66.00 
PETITIONE~ Keith C. Lanham represent to the Court that: 
1. Petitioner is a son and heir of the above named decedent and is a person interested 
in the above-entitled Estate. 
2. That on or about December 24, 2013, Judd Max Lanham was appointed Personal 
Representative of this Estate. 
3. Cause for removal of Judd Max Lanham as such Personal Representative exists for 
the following reasons: 
a said Personal Representative has submitted what he claims to be the Decedent's 
Last Will and Testament that was taken from an oral recording and transcribed by Rebecca 
Clift on January 19, 2011. Petitioner herein believes said transcriber is a friend or employee 
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of Judd Max Lanham and the transcript submitted as the Decedent's Last Will and 
Testament is not certified as a true and accurate and complete transcription of said oral 
recording. In addition, Rebecca Clift is the notary for all the signatures on this purported 
Will and upon information and belief is either a friend of or works for Judd Max Lanham. 
b. That almost immediately after the death of decedent and before his body had 
been removed from his home, Petitioner observe the wife of his nephew Jessica Lanham 
remove $2,000.00 in cash from Decedent's wallet and leave with Judd Max Lanham who 
had the Decedent's check book with the stated intent of going to see the builder, Paul 
Drake, who was building a home for his nephew Joseph Lanham, to pay this builder 
approximately $7,000.00 that was due for work completed on said home. And on 
information and belief, Petitioner believes that Judd Max Lanham wrote a check to Paul 
Drake on the Decedent's checking account for at least $5,000.00 and possibly $7,000.00 to 
pay for said completed construction on Petitioner's nephew Joseph Lanham and has remove 
many items of personal property of the Decedent from the home of the Decedent and has 
refused to account for the same. Although Petitioner has questioned Judd Max Lanham 
about these matters, he refuses to discuss the same with Petitioner and refuses to tum over 
pictures Judd Max Lanham claims he has of all of the Decedent's assets that were located in 
the Decedent's home. 
c. undertaking to remodel the home Decedent owned and deeded to Joseph Lanham 
approximately 2 weeks before his death which Petitioner believes is being done with funds 
of the estate. 
d. The failure of Judd Max Lanham to secure the Decedent's assets for probate. 
e. That Petitioner requested the oral recording from which the purported Last Will 
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and Testament was transcribed and was advised by the attorney for the Estate and Personal 
Representative Judd Max Lanham that he was unable to locate the same. 
4. That I am aware that the Decedent has used illegal drugs and abused alcohol. Given 
the rambling and somewhat incoherent nature of this purported Last Will and Testament 
submitted for probate herein, wherein it appears in many ways nonsensical and the product 
of an incompetent person or one not of sound mind and the same does not contain any clear 
and specific dispositive provisions of the Decedent's estate and the suspect circumstances in 
how this purported Will was prepared by, this purported Will should be declared invalid. 
Wherefore, Petitioner requests that this Court (a) remove Judd Max Lanham as 
Personal Representative and appoint the Decedent's sister, Kathy Gillihan to administer the 
Estate and/or issue a restraining order against his disposing of any estate assets until this 
matter can be resolved, (b) declare that the Last Will and Testament submitted for probate 
herein is invalid as the product of undue influence or that the Decedent was incompetent at 
the time of said dictation and/or execution of the Will, ( c) that the Decedent died intestate 
and (d) order Judd Max Lanham to restore the $2,000.00 and any funds paid to Paul Drake 
out of the Decedent's checking account and return all personal property of the Decedent 
removed by Judd Max Lanham reference above, as assets of the estate to be probated herein 
and ( e) require Judd Max Lanham to file a full and complete accounting of all assets of the 
Decedent, including without limitation those referred to in paragraph 3 hereof, while the 
same were under his control or in his possession following the Decedent's 
Dated this 10th day of January 2014. 
WILLIAM F. LEE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Gem ) 
Keith C. Lanham personally appeared before me the undersigned Notary Public, and 
being first duly sworn upon oath and known or identified to me to be the person who 
subscribed and has sworn to the within and foregoing Petition and acknowledge to me that 
he executed the same and that the statements and allegations contained therein are true and 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SY{.Q~ To before me ,,,, ,,,, 
,,, "' F ,,,. 
,, '""''" . lb ~,. ~' 'v ...... ~~ ~-. 
' '.\.I .. .. .
~ ~' .• •. . F L 
~ -r •• 1 AR}' \ \V\ · ee ! i +0 ,,. • ir !,JOT ARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
: I -· ~ I> "d' E Idah • , " i'"es1 mg at mmett, o 
\ \. PU6\. -~ /Commission Expires: 03/23/2017 
ti! .. • .;:,,· 'Ii 
ti!,; ,J>-,. ........ <"\ '. 11t' ~, "4 \V rti' 
~,,,,~lile~ TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of January 2014, I served a true and 
accurate copy of this Petition to Nancy L. Callahan, attorney for this Estate and Personal 
Representative, by leaving a copy in said counsel's basket at the Gem County 
Courthouse. 
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attorney & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-4 72-8846 
208-947-5910 fax 
Attorney for Petitioner 
_F_l,J~ 
MAR 2 4 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
PETITION FOR ORDER RESTRAINING 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
LC. § 15-3-607 
PETITIONER, THOMAS LANHAM STATES AND REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT: 
I. Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of and heir and child of the decedent. 
2. That on or about December 24, 2013, Judd Max Lanham was appointed Personal 
Representative of this Estate. 
3. Cause for temporarily restraining Judd Max Lanham as Personal Representative 
exists for the following reasons: 
a. Said Personal Representative has submitted what he claims to be the 
Decedent's Last Will and Testament. Petitioner is contesting the validity of said Will in his Petition 
filed concurrently herewith. 
b. That Judd Max Lanham wrote a check to Paul Drake on the Decedent's 
checking account for at least $5,000.00 and possibly $7,000.00 to pay for said construction on a 
house for Joseph Lanham. 
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C. That Judd Max Lanham has removed many items of personal property of the 
Decedent from the home of the Decedent and has refused to account for the same. 
d. That Judd Max Lanham has failed to secure the Decedent's assets for 
probate. 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT: 
1. The Court fix a time and place of hearing. 
2. Notice be given as required by law. 
3. The Court enter an order Temporarily Restraining Judd Max Lanham as Personal 
Representative of the estate. 
Dated: 3 'l O -"Zc.)/vf 
PETITION FOR ORDER RESTRAINING PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2 
25
MAR EO 2~5 7:11AM HP LAr 'JET 3200 
'-' 






The petitioner~ being swom, having read the foregoing says that the facts set forth herein are 
true, accurate, and complete to the best of Petitioner's knowledge and belie£ 
1,__ C µ__ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to bef'oreme 1his ~ dayof~h, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the~ certify that on 1be /)_ f ::;:f March 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the im,going to be forwarded wi~ n,quirecl charges prepaid, by 1he method(s) 
indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil~ to the fullowing pelSOD{s): 
Nancy Callahan .ft!.s. Mail 
101 Canal Street _Fax 208-365-1646 
Emmett, ID 83617 _By Hand 
Vtlliam F. Lee ~U.S. Mail 
629 E. Main Street 
F.mmett, ID 83617 
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· Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
F I ~i)i; 9.u: 
APR 08 2014 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 










CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
This memorandum is respectfully submitted to the Court in 
support of the Personal Representatives Motion for Attorney's fees filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
This action is an informal probate of the estate of Gordon Thomas 
Lanham. Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5, 2013. He left a 
Will and the original document was submitted to the Court upon 
Application for Informal Probate on December 20, 2013. Judd Lanham 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
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was nominated by the decedent to serve as his personal representative 
and Judd Lanham was appointed personal representative. 
On January 8, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, a son, filed pro se 
an Application to Attest Personal Representative with a claim that the 
will was not valid and that the personal representative was not qualified. 
On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham, by and through his attorney 
William F. Lee filed a Petition to Remove Personal Representative with 
claims contesting the validity of the will and removal of the personal 
representative. The matters were set for hearing on January 21, 2014. 
On January 21, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, pro se, and Keith 
Lanham with his attorney, William F. Lee, were present in Court. Judd 
Lanham was present with counsel. Also present were the two witnesses 
to the decedent's will, Rebecca Clift, notary, Cathy Gillihan, sister of the 
decedent, and other family members. This Court advised the parties 
that two matters were before the Court; the issue of removal of the 
personal representative and the validity of the will. The Court advised 
the parties that it was not inclined to remove the personal 
representative and that the matters concerning the construction of the 
will were continued for a half day trial on April 2, 2014. 
On March 24, 2014 Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in 
this case and filed another Petition for Order Removing Personal 
Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a Petition of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
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Order Restraining Personal Representative on behalf of Thomas Everett 
Lanham and set a hearing for April 3, 2014 at 11 :00. On March 28, 
2014 the personal representative, Judd Lanham, filed his affidavit 
concerning the audio recording of the decedent and the basis of the will 
document that is before the court 
On March 28, 2014, William F. Lee, on behalf of Keith Lanham, 
withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal Representative and his claim 
contesting the validity of the will. 
On April 2, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham or his attorney failed to 
appear for the Court trial to construe or determine the validity of the will 
pending since January 21, 2014. 
On April 3, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham appeared with his counsel, 
Douglas Fleenor, for hearing on their Petition for Order Removing 
Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a 
Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court having 
reviewed the record and arguments of counsel denied the Petition for 
Order Removing Personal Representative and further denied the Petition 
for Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court awarded the 
estate attorney's fees. 
Argument 
Thomas E. Lanham is the son of Gordon Thomas Lanham. The will 
document and the audio of Gordon Thomas Lanham specifically gives 
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Thomas E. Lanham $1.00 and a bed made by his grandfather. Thomas 
E. Lanham was present in Court on January 21, 2014 when the Court 
declined removing the personal representative and the trial to construe 
the will was set in open Court for April 2, 2014. Attorney Fleenor's 
failure to review the record in this case to learn of the pending trial, or 
to investigate the previous court proceedings, or the court's previous 
consideration concerning removal of the personal representative on 
January 21, 2014, he most likely would not have filed duplicative 
pleadings unless they were filed merely to harass and impede the 
informal probate process. As a result, the court having reviewed the 
record denied both the Petition for Order Removing Personal 
Representative and the Petition for Order Restraining Personal 
Representative. The estate was the prevailing party. It was also 
inexcusable neglect on behalf of Thomas E. Lanham and his attorney of 
record, Douglas Fleenor, to fail to appear on April 2, 2014. 
The Court has the discretion to award attorney fees and costs. 
The exercise of that discretion is guided by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) which 
provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion 
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to 
the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were 
multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, 
or other multiple of cross issues between the parties, and the 
extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or 
claims. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine 
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that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in 
part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and 
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after 
considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. Id. 
(emphasis added.) 
"[T]here are three principal factors the trial court must consider 
when determining which party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final 
judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) 
whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and 
(3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed one each of the 
claims or issues." Sanders v. Lankford 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823, 
826 (Ct.App. 2000). The "result obtained" may be the product of a 
court judgment or a settlement reached by the parties. Jerry J. Joseph 
C.L.U. Assoc. vs. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 5557, 789 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(Ct.App.1990); Ladd v. Coats, 105 Idaho 250, 602 P.2d 126 
(Ct.App.1983). 
Idaho Code §12-121, states in relevant part: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided 
that this section shall not alter, repeal, or amend any statute 
which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. 
Attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-121 "may be awarded by 
the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonable, or 
without foundation." I. R.C. P. 54( e)( 1). Moreover, "[a]ttorney fees 
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are not appropriate under I.C. §12-121 and I.C.R.P. 54(E) unless all 
claims brought are frivolous and without foundation." Bingham v. 
Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999). 
The decision to award attorney fees under I.C. §12-121 rests in the 
sound discretion of the district court and will only be reversed where 
there is an abuse of discretion. Id. 
A calculation of the award of attorney fees is committed to the 
sound discretion of the District Court. Lettunich v. Lettunich1 141 
Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110 (2005). The rule requires the district court 
to consider all eleven factors plus any other factor deemed 
appropriate. Lettunich1 141 Idaho at 4351 111 P.3d at 120 (citing 
Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Netbaur, 113 Idaho 402, 987 
P.2d 314 (1999). However, in Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. 
Co. 1 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 614, 618 (2007), it noted that "the 
court need not specifically address all of the factors contained in 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long as the record clearly indicates the 
Court considered them all." (quoting Boe/ v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 
137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002)). 
The pertinent factors that this court should consider 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) are: 
(A) The time and labor required 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions 
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(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly and the experience and ability of the 
attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstance of the case 
(G) Not relevant 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) Not relevant 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) Not relevant 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate 
in the particular case. 
The Court should also consider an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho §12-123(2)(a) which states: 
In accordance with the provisions of this section, a any 
time prior to the commencement of the trial in a civil 
action or within twenty one (21) days after the entry of 
judgment in a civil action, the court may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely 
affected by frivolous conduct. 
Idaho Code §12-123 (l)(b) addresses the definition of 
"Frivolous Conduct" as it applies in this case: "Frivolous 
conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his 
counsel of record that satisfies either of the following: 
i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another party to a civil action; 
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ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing 
law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
Or, based upon the facts of this case the Court could consider 
the award of attorney's fees as a sanction under I.C.R.P 
ll(a)(l): 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate 
that the attorney or party had read the pleading, motion or other 
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, 
and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for he 
extension, modification, or reversal or existing law, and that it is 
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
In this case the fact that the Court had previously 
considered the issue of removal of the personal representative 
and the matter pending before the Court on April 2, 2104 was 
concerning the construction of the will, the pleadings filed on 
behalf of Thomas E. Lanham on March 24, 2014, were not filed 
after a reasonable inquiry, otherwise attorney, Douglas Fleenor 
would have known that the Court had previously addressed the 
issue concerning removal of the personal representative and that 
the trial concerning the construction of the will was scheduled for 
April 2, 2014. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS- PAGE 8 
34
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm 
the award of attorney's fees entered and placed on the record on 
April 3,2014 and Order that Thomas E. Lanham and/or his 
attorney, Douglas Fleenor, reimburse the estate of Gordon 
Thomas Lanham the sum set forth on the Affidavit of Nancy L. 
Callahan submitted conte~~aneously herewith. 
Dated this er-- day of pril 2014.J 
.·~ 
Nancy L allahan, 
Attorne s for Personal Representative 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this~ day of 
April 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing legal 
document to be served upon the individual named below in the manner 
indicated: 
[ ~SIMILE TRANSMISSION 
Douglas E. Fleenor 
Attorney for Thomas Everett Lanham 
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
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Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 









CASE NO. CV2013-886 
AFFIDAVIT FOR ATIORNEY1S 
FEES AND COSTS 
Your Affiant, NANCY L. CALLAHAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. That your Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for the above named 
Defendant and has personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein; 
2. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A11 and incorporated herein by this 
reference, is a true and correct r::opy of Defendant 1s attorney fee and 
cost billing incurred in this matter that relate to the Petition for Order 
Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining 
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Heirs and a Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative on 
behalf of Thomas Everett on March 24, 2014. The charges set forth on 
Exhibit "A" were incurred by the estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham 
from Defendant from March 25, 2014 through and including April 3, 
2014 as and for fees related to above referenced filings in the total 
sum of $2397.50. 
3. Your Affiant is an attorney duly licensed and practicing in the State of 
Idaho with offices located at 101 Canal Street, Emmett, Idaho, and is 
the attorney for the Defendant. 
4. Your Affiant has represented the personal representative upon an 
agreed hourly rate of $175.00 per hour in .2 increments of an hour. 
Your Affiant has reviewed the attached Exhibit "A" of attorney fees and 
costs incurred by the estate and believes that the charges reflected on 
Exhibit "A" are reasonable for representation in this matter. 
DATED this §)·day of Apri 
allahan, 
ys for Personal Representative 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
,.. 
Publi~~,,n~,ihe State of I a 
~ ,...\,~ ••••••••• f>'..j,~~ 
r§.n,,,,.v.• •. ,~ ~ 
~ ,-.· .. ~ ::: . TAR .. -:::. 
§ :· \\0 ,. \ s = : : = 
~ \ Pue1..,c .: § 
~ ·. .. s 
~ .. ·~,;:: 
~ cS'··· ... · .. '>..v* ,;.~ "J;r;. ....... ~ ~ ~ ~ 
;,//// I e Of \v 'II.,,,~ 
111: .. :1111\\\\\\: 
Notary Pub 
Residing at: --r-1!'-6~-\-=---+--' Id ah o 
Commission E -y~ -zR/'( 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this ~y of April 
2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing legal document to be 
served upon the following named individual in the manner indicated: 
[ ~ACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
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EXHIBIT A 
03/25/2014 Review new pleadings filed by D. 
Fleenor for Tom Lanham. Email to client. 
Telephone call from Bill Lee. His client will not 
be going forward with the will contest. 
03/26/2014 Review audio recordings of GT 
dictating his will and disposition of property .1. 5 
Draft Affidavit of Judd Lanham. 1.0 Email to 
client. Telephone conference with client. .4 
Research re: will construction, responsibilities of 
PR, etc. 1.0. 
03/27/2014 Office conference with client re: 
trial prep. Unclear what was going on with Tom 
Jr's new filings. 
03/28/2014 Prepare Notice of Service for 
Affidavit and CD filing and mailing, Receive and 
review pleadings from Bill Lee re: Keith's 
withdrawal of his petition. 
04/1/2014 Telephone call from client re: 
witnesses. 
04/02/2014 Final prep for trial. 1.0 Attend 
Court. Conference with client Neither T.Lanham 
or attorney Fleenor appeared. 
04/03/2014 Prep for hearing. Attend court, 
Petitions denied. Conference with client. 
04/05/2014 Rough draft of Motion, Affidavit, 
and Memo for Attorney fees. 
04/07/2014 Finish Motion, Affidavit and Memo, 












Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: {208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: {208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
_r_-_I ~A-Qu. 
APR O 8 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 









CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
_________ ) 
COMES NOW, the JUDD LANHAM, personal representative, by 
and through his attorneys of record, THE LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. 
CALLAHAN, and hereby moves this Court for the entry of an Order for 
Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to I.C. §12-120, §12-121,§12-
123(2)(a), I.R.C.P. 11 and Rule 54(e). 
This motion is made and based upon the court files and the 
Affidavit for Attorney's Fees and Costs submitted herewith. 
DATED this ~ d of April 4. 
r/J. 
. Calahan, 
eys for Personal Representative. 
nR\G' '. t_} I •. 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 1 
40
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this £ay of April 
2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing legal document to be 
served upon the individuals named below in the manner indicated: 
[~~SIMILE TRANSMISSION 
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From': Key Business Center 
Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attorney & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-4 72-8 846 
208-947-5910 fax 
208 947 5910 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
04/\-2014 12:30 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
#849 P.002/007 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Thomas Lanham, by and through his attorney of record, 
Douglas E. Fleenor, and objects to the Personal Representative's Motion For Attorney Fees and 
Costs dated April 8, 2014, for the following reasons: 
1. Petitioner did not bring a claim frivolously, W1reasonably or without foundation; 
2. The claimed attorney fees are excessive and should be reduced to a reasonable 
amount. 
On December 20, 2013, Judd Lanham filed his Petition for Informal appointment as 
personal representative of the above estate. The purported Will of the decedent was admitted to 
probate. The Will contained language that may exclude decedent's two sons, Keith Lanham 
("Keith"), and Thomas Lanham ("Thomas"). However, the Will did not contain dispositive 
provisions and failed to name residuary beneficiaries. The Personal Representative inferred the 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1 
42
From:Key Business Center 208 947 5910 04/),,.(2014 12:30 #849 P.003/007 
lack of named beneficiaries to signify that he could distribute the estate as he saw fit, and began 
giving away decedent's property. 
On or about January 8, 2014, Thomas filed an "Application to Attest Personal 
Representative." This Application was never noticed for hearing. 
On January 13, 2014, Keith filed a motion though his attorney Lee to remove the 
Personal Representative for cause. Under Idaho Code section 15·3-611, upon receipt of said 
motion, the Personal Representative was stayed from further transactions of the estate, except to 
account, to correct maladministration or preserve the estate. However, the Personal 
Representative continued to give away estate property. Keith's motion was set for hearing on 
January 21, 2014. The hearing was then continued until April 2, 2014. 
On February 10, 2014, Thomas retained attorney Fleenor to represent his interests. 
Attorney Fleenor spoke to Nancy Callahan, the attorney for the Personal Representative, to 
inquire about the stay pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-611. Attorney Callahan could not articulate 
whether the stay was enforced, but thought the judge was allowing the Personal Representative 
to continue to act until the next hearing on April 2, 2014. 
On March 20, 2014, attorney Lee informed attorney Fleenor that his client had settled 
with the estate and would be withdrawing his Petition. 
On March 21, 2014, attorney Fleenor filed a Petition to Restrain Personal Repetitive and 
a Petition to Construe the Will. Upon belief that the April 2, 2014 hearing had been vacated, the 
Petition to Restrain the Personal Representative was noticed for a hearing date of April 3, 2014. 
On March 31, 2014, attorney Lee served his Notice of Withdrawal of Petition to remove 
Personal Representative. 
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The Petition to Restrain the Personal Representative Was Not Frivolous, 
Unreasonable, Or Without Foundation. 
#649 P.004/007 
This court has already awarded attorney fees for the Personal Representative appearing at 
the April 2, 2014 hearing. The Personal Representative's brief does not appear to attempt to 
expand that ruling. However, IRCP Rule 54(e) states that, "attorney fees under section 12-121 
Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that 
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 0 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
Thomas petitioned this Court to restrain the Personal Representative. This petition was 
brought in good faith pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-607, which allows any person with an interest in the 
estate to make such a petition. Since the Will of the decedent does not have distributive 
provision, and the Personal Representative was giving away property, some of which may be 
irreplaceable, Thomas reasonably brought his Petition with good fowidation. 
Therefore, charges awarded against Thomas should only be related to the missed hearing 
set for April 2, 2014, not to charges the personal representative incurred related to preparing for 
Keith's motions, or preparing for Thomas's Petition which was reasonable brought and heard on 
April 3, 2014. 
The Legal Charges Claimed By The Personal Representative Are Excessive. 
The personal representative claims .4 hours on March 25, 2014, to review the pleadings 
of Thomas Lanham, email with client, and telephone call with attorney lees. Some of these 
items are unrelated to matters brought by Thomas. The items which related to the petition from 
Thomas are for his Petition to Restrain, which was set for April 3, 2014, or for Thomas' s Motion 
to Construe, which has not yet been set. None of these charges are related to time spend at the 
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hearing on April 2, 2014 
The personal representative claims 3.9 homs on March 26, 2014, to review the audio 
recording, draft an affidavit for Judd to state the audio is correct, and perform research on will 
construction. These items related to Thomas' s Motion to Construe which has not yet been set for 
hearing, and not for time spent at the hearing on April 2, 2014. If any of this time was spent 
preparing for the April 2, 2014 hearing, at least half of that time should be allocated to Keith's 
motion which was still pending. 
The personal representative claims 1 hour on March 27, 2014, for trial preparation. 
Although this time may be related to the hearing on April 2, 2014, the Personal representative 
had not yet received Keith's notice of withdrawal of motion, and thus the time should be equally 
divided between preparation for Keith's motion and Thomas's petition. 
The personal representative claims .4 hours on March 28, 2014, to prepare a Notice of 
Service fort the CD of the audio recordings and review the withdrawal pleading from attorney 
Lee. The Notice of service went to both attorney Fleenor and attorney Lee. The time spend 
preparing of the notice of the CD is therefore related to both Thomas's Petition to Construe and 
Keith's pending Motion, not to the April 2, 2014 hearing. The time spent reviewing the 
withdrawal of motion from attorney Lee is not related to any action by Thomas. In addition~ this 
charge appears to be fabricated as attorney Lee did not serve his withdrawal pleading until 
March 31, 2014, making review of that document on March 28, 2014, impossible. 
The personal representative claims 2 homs on April 2, 2014. One of those hours is 
designated as final trial preparation, thus the remaining hour must be for appearing at the 
hearing. However, since Thomas did not appear at the hearing, and Keith had withdrawn his 
motion, a charge of one hour for minutes spent at the courthouse is excessive. 
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The personal representative claims 1.5 hours on April 3, 2014, for trial preparation and 
attending the hearing on Thomas's petition to restrain the personal representative. These items 
are related to Thomas~s petition to restrain, and are unrelated to time spent at the previous 
hearing on April 2, 2014. In addition, the Personal Representative argued this hearing involved 
the same issues as the hearing scheduled for the day before. Since she had already spent an hour 
in final trial preparation and was ready for trial, an additional hour of trial preparation on the 
same issue is excessive. 
The personal representative claims 2.5 hours on April 6, 2014, and 1.8 hours on April 7, 
20214 to draft the Motion, Affidavit, and Memo for attorney fees. Charging 4.3 hours to draft 
these standard docwnents, consisting of a half page motion, a two page affidavit (with attached 
billing printout), and an unnecessary memorandum which simply restates arguments made in 
court where the court had already granted the personal representative's request for attorney fees, 
is excessive. 
For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Personal Representative's 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs be reduced to reflect a reasonable amount. 
Respectfully submitted this _J{1 April, 2014. 
~u~:er 
Attorney for Thomas Lanham 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·,-h I, the undersigned, certify that on the ___L day of April, 2014, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) 
indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Callahan 
101 Canal Street 
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attorney & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-4 72-8846 
208-947-5910 fax 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, by and through his attorney of record, 
Douglas E. Fleenor, and moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 56, I.R.C.P., for its order granting 
summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and thus 
Petitioner is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. This Motion is made and based on Rule 56 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Memorandum in Support thereof, filed contemporaneously 
herewith, and the files and records in the above entitled matter. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS HEREBY REQUESTED. 
"7""l ,J 
DATED this_~ day of April, 2014. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, .. 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the 73day of April 2014, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) 
indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Callahan 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
William F. Lee 
629 E. Main Street 
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From:Key Business Center 
Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attorney & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83 702 
208-472-8846 
208-947-5910 fax 
208 947 5910 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
#870 P.004/008 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, by and through his attorney, Douglas 
E. Fleenor, and submits his Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment 
Petitioner seeks summary judgment declaring that property of the decedent passed 
intestate to the decedent's heirs for the reason that the Last Will and Testament of the decedent 
fails to dispose of all of decedent's property. 
FACTS 
The personal representative filed a purported Last Will and Testament of the above 
named decedent dated January 19, 2011. 
Decedent's Last Will and Testament fails to make any dispositive provisions or give 
direction regarding the residue of his estate. 
In paragraph four on page two, the Will states, "I want [Judd] to be able to distribute my 
property and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will try to put all the wording 
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about the personal effects." Then again in the last paragraph, the Will reiterates,, "I want [Judd} 
to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in my Last Will and 
Testament." 
Page 3 of the Will contains the only possible devise, stating " .. .I gotta $3,000 sheep head 
that Judd can hang up in his cabin ifhe wants to." 
The remainder of the Will discusses the ownership of certain property located at his 
residence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate with the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions 
on file show th.at there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Failure of a party to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and upon which that 
party bears the burden of proof entitles the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has thoroughly addressed the standards governing motions for summary 
judgment. 
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court is generally required to 
liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions, drawing 
all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that partyts favor. Construction Management Systems, 
Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 680, 682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001). However, Rule 
56(3) requires the non-moving party to go beyond pleadings through affidavit, depositions, etc., to 
demonstrate that there are genuine issue of material facts, Doe v. Durischi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P .2d 
1238 (1986). If the non-moving party fails to do so, then the moving party is entitled to summary 
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judgment as a matter of law. Id at 46, 716 P.2d at 1241; see also Sparks v. St. Lukes Reg. Medical 
Ctr. Ltd, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988). 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho has adopted of the Uniform Probate Code, which allows decedents to pass their 
property upon death through a validly executed Will. 
A will should be interpreted, if possible, in such manner as to prevent intestacy when it 
evinces an intention to dispose of the entire estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 6, 383 P.2d 
339,341 (1963). 
However, a devisee must be identified so that the courts can be certain that the testator's 
intents and purposes are being carried out. Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105, 108, 416 P.2d 
164, 167 (1966), quoting 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, pg. 18, § 363. 
In order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court is not permitted to place 
on the will any construction not expressed in it. and which is based on supposition as to the 
intention of the testator in the disposition of his estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 
P.2d 339,341 (1963); In re Hoytema's Estate, 180 Cal. 430, 181 P. 645; In re Beldon's Estate, 11 
Cal.2d 108, 77 P.2d 1052; 95 C.J.S. Wills§ 615c. 
Idaho statutes authorize a person to devise or bequeath his property, but it does not permit 
him to delegate to another the power to make such disposition for him. Hedin v. Westdala 
Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241, 250, 81 P.2d 741, 745 (1938). Such testamentary efforts have 
been likened unto powers of attorney to make wills, which the law does not permit. Id 
Each of the above cases held that a devise fails when a devisee is not designated with 
sufficient legal certainty. Examples of failed devises included a gift to any charitable 
organization chosen by a spouse (Hedin), devising the residue to any worthy charity selected by 
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the executor (Yribar), and a failure to dispose of half the estate (Corwin). Without a defined 
devisee, the court cannot ascertain or enforce a decedent's intent. 
Idaho Statutes also state that any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed 
of by his will passes to his heirs. I.C. § 15-2-101. In addition, if any devise fails for any reason, it 
becomes part of the residue. I.C. § 15·2-606. 
When a devise fails and the will lacks a residuary clause, the residue passes through 
intestate succession. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 3391 341 (1963). 
In this case, even if the Will is valid, the decedent clearly failed to name devisees for his 
property. Therefore, as a matter of law, decedent's entire estate, with the possible exception of 
one specific devise, passes to his heirs by intestate succession pursuant to Chapter 2, Title 15 of 
the Idaho Code. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoingJ summary judgment should be granted in favor of Petitioner, 
finding the property of decedent passes to his heirs by intestate succession. 
DATED this 'fl day of April, 2014. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
FIA.~ 
MAY 2 3 2014 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 










CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
This memorandum is respectfully submitted to the Court in 
support of the Personal Representative's CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO THOMAS EVERETT 
LAN HAM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Gordon Thomas Lanham executed a Last Will and Testament on 
January 19, 2011 naming his cousin, Judd Lanham executor giving him 
Power of Attorney over all of his personal and real property. The Last 
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Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham specifically provided for 
his sons Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham to each receive a dollar and 
a bed made by their grandfather. The children of Keith Lanham were 
also specifically disinherited. The Last Will and Testament was 
transcribed from a recording made by the testator over a period of time. 
On or about November 19, 2013 the testator executed a Transfer 
on Death Deed naming Petitioner's son, Joe Lanham, beneficiary, 
subject to payment of a mortgage to his former girlfriend and his 
brother Rex Lanham Jr.'s ex-wife, Linda Louise Andrews Lanham(aka) 
Linda Louise Andrews, . Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5, 
2013. The original Will was filed with the Court on December 20, 2013 
and Judd Lanham was informally appointed personal representative. 
On January 8, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham 1 a son, filed pro se 
an "Application to Attest Personal Representative" in the probate case 
with a claim that the will was not valid and that the personal 
representative was not qualified. On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham, 
by and through his attorney William F. Lee filed a Petition to Remove 
Personal Representative with claims contesting the validity of the will 
and removal of the personal representative. The matters were set for 
hearing on January 21, 2014. 
On or about January 15, 2014, the personal representative 
attempted to satisfy the mortgage to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham in 
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the amount of $54,625.00 from funds left to the personal representative 
in a POD account. He was verbally instructed by the decedent prior to 
his death that Joe Lanham would take the ranch free and clear of any 
encumbrances. Linda Andrews Lanham refused to accept payment of 
the mortgage. 
On January 21, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, pro se, and Keith 
Lanham with his attorney, William F. Lee, were present in Court in the 
probate case. Judd Lanham was present with counsel. Also present 
were the two witnesses to the decedent's Will, Rebecca Clift, notary, 
Cathy Gillihan, sister of the decedent, and other family members. This 
Court advised the parties that two matters were before the Court; the 
issue of removal of the personal representative and the validity of the 
Will. The Court advised the parties that it was not inclined to remove 
the personal representative and that the matters concerning the 
construction of the will were continued for a half day trial on April 2, 
2014. 
On March 5, 2014 the Personal Representative and Joe Lanham 
filed a Quiet Title action in Gem County Case No. 2014-185 due to Linda 
Andrews' refusal to accept satisfaction of the mortgage. 
On March 24, 2014 Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in this case 
on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham in the probate case and in the 
quiet title action on behalf of Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. In the 
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probate case he filed another Petition for Order Removing Personal 
Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a Petition of 
Order Restraining Personal Representative on behalf of Thomas Everett 
Lanham. 
On March 28, 2014 the personal representative, Judd Lanham, 
filed his affidavit concerning the audio recording of the decedent which 
was the basis for the Will in contest and because the recording included 
additional instruction to the personal representative for distribution of 
his personal property. 
On March 28, 2014, William F. Lee, on behalf of Keith Lanham, 
withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal Representative and Keith's 
claim contesting the validity of the will. 
On April 2, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham or his attorney failed to 
appear for the Court trial to construe or determine the validity of the 
Will, a trial that was pending since January 21, 2014. 
On April 3, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham appeared with his counsel, 
Douglas Fleenor, for hearing on their Petition for Order Removing 
Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a 
Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court having 
reviewed the record and arguments of counsel denied the Petition for 
Order Removing Personal Representative and further denied the Petition 
for Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court awarded the 
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estate attorney's fees. 
On April 9, 2014 Attorney Fleenor filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim in the quiet title action alleging the deed transferring the 
ranch to Joe Lanham was void and the ranch should be included in the 
estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham. Linda Louis Andrews further claimed 
that the decedent failed to make any principle payments on the 
December 17, 2002 mortgage entitling her to $137,369.46. Paragraph 
6 of the Counterclaim alleges that: 
"On August 19, 2004, Gordon Thomas Lanham coerced Linda Lanham 
into signing a "Mortgage Payment", by threatening to expose and 
distribute personal, private and revealing photographs of Linda Lanham. 
The purported amount of the interest payment was $23,400.00." 
Paragraphs 8 and 9 further allege: 
"That on December 11, 2006, Gordon Thomas Lanham fraudulently 
caused Linda Lanham to enter into an accord and satisfaction agreement 
by promising her payment of cash in the amount to $50,000. The 
accord and satisfaction consisted of Linda Lanham signing a Satisfaction 
of Mortgage for the December 17, 2002 Mortgage, in exchange for 
Gordon Thomas Lanham paying Linda Lanham $50,000 in cash and 
executing a new Promissory Note and Mortgage in the amount of 
$50,000 bearing interest at the rate of 3°/o annum. Upon obtaining 
Linda Lanham's signatures, Gordon Thomas Lanham left the premises 
without paying Linda Lanham any of the promised amounts." 
On April 21, 2014 the personal representative and Joe Lanham 
filed a reply to Linda Andrew's counterclaim alleging any claims of fraud 
made by Linda Andrews is barred by the statute of limitations and the 
only amount due to Linda Andrews is $54,625.00. 
On about April 21, 2014, an estate check in the amount of 
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$54,625.00 was sent to Mr. Fleenor and Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. 
On April 23, 2014, Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in Gem County Case No.2014-187 on behalf of Linda Louise 
Andrews Lanham on the issue that the Deed to Joe Lanham is void and 
claims that the ranch should be included in the decedent's estate. On 
that same day Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in 
this probate case on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham on the issue that 
the Will fails to make any dispositive provisions or give direction 
regarding the residue of his father's estate and should pass intestate to 
decedent's heirs. 
ARGUMENT 
The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham clearly 
and unambiguously and for independent reason, specifically 
bequeathed that his sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby 
Lanham, each receive one dollar and a bed that there grandfather 
made for them each as children be returned to them, with the intent 
that his sons take nothing from his estate. The will also specifically 
states that the children of Keith Colby Lanham would receive nothing 
from his estate. 
On the first page of the will Gordon Thomas Lanham states that: 
"This is a new day. It's the 29th of November. Thanksgiving is over and 
I just wanted to add to this program that my son, Thomas Everett 
Lanham, 48 years old, has already been given all that he needs to have 
and that I am going to leave $1 (sic) more dollar against whatever is 
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legal to him and then he is going to be on his own." 
On Page 2 paragraph 1 the Will states: 
"It's a new day and it's snowing. It's 1st December 2010. It's the first 
snow out back. I am not really looking forward to it, .... but anyway, I 
want to go on about my son, Keith Colby Lanham and his wife, Amy 
Lanham, that I am going to try to write it down or leave it in this 
recording that... what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my 
estate I don't want him to be able to sell and profit off his alcoholism or 
drugs .... 
Track 7 and 8 of the audio recording previously submitted allows 
one to hear this decision he made to disinherit his sons in the decedent's 
own words. 
Track 8 of the audio recording made by the decedent (the entry 
dated March 19, 2011) on the CD previously submitted to the Court, 
clearly and unambiguously instructed that the lots at Big Creek property 
were to be distributed as follows: 
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side of that Big Creek 
Property to Jamie Gillihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for 
leaving the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham 
and my other grandson Thomas Robert John Lanham and he is only 
eighteen and Joe is 21 so I don't know how that will work on a deed etc. 
However that works, but anyway, I'm working on what I am going to do 
with this house and 34 acres because of the $50,000 mortgage that 
Lizzie has on it, I'm thinking that Jamie can pay her mortgage for his 
27" acres ... " 
The Court should take judicial notice of the quiet title action 
concerning the decedent's real property, Gem County Case No. CV2014-
187. In that case the issue is payment of the "$50,000 mortgage that 
Lizzie has on it", her counterclaim states that she is entitled to 
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$137,369.49, her claim the deed intended to gih the ranch to Joe 
Lanham is void, and claiming that the ranch should be included in this 
estate case, presumably as part of the residual estate. Then in this 
case, Thomas Everett is challenging the validity of the will to claim an 
intestate portion of the residual estate. 
Trial courts must determine the admissibility of evidence as a 
"threshold question" to be answered before addressing the merits of 
motions for summary judgment. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778,784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992), Ryan v 
Beisner, 123 Idaho at 45, 844 P.2d at 27 (Ct.App. 1992), Gem State 
Ins. Co. v Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.2d.172(2007), 
Montgomery v Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1 at 6 (Idaho 2009). 
When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider material 
which would be admissible at trial. Petricevich v Salmon River 
Canal,Co., 92 Idaho 865-,869, 452 P.2d 362,366 (1969) I.R.C.P. 
56(e). 
In addressing the evidentiary issues raised concerning the 
statements attributed to Gordon Thomas Lanham on the CD recording 
concerning the distribution of his estate, and the Affidavits of 
Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Lanham and Keith Lanham inform the 
court of the decedent's reasons and intent to completely disinherit 
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Thomas Everett Lanham after quitclaiming 115 acres to Thomas 
Everett on his promise to help financially support his father as set forth 
in the affidavits submitted herewith are admissible hearsay and will be 
admitted as evidence at trial as exception to hearsay rule I.R.E. 
803(3) which provides: 
Rule 803: Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial 
(3) The Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical 
Condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing 
state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
(such as intent, plan, motive, design mental feeling, pan, 
and bodily heath), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it 
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms 
of declarant's will. ( emphasis added) 
The Affidavit of Catherine Lanham Gillihan (Exhibit 1) and the 
Affidavit of Keith Lanham (Exhibit 3), support the decedent's wishes 
that neither Keith Lanham nor Thomas Everett were to profit from the 
estate and that Judd Lanham should distribute his remaining personal 
property. 
The Affidavit of Judd Lanham, personal representative, clarifies 
the terms of the will concerning the statement in the will that "I want 
Judd to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects in 
any way that he sees fit and I will try to put all the wording" in that 
Gordon Thomas Lanham believed at the time of his death that the only 
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remaining property after his specific bequests would be personal 
property items to be distributed in-kind, if possible. 
The intended beneficiaries of this estate are the sons of Thomas 
Everett Lanham, namely Joseph "Joe" Lanham and Robert "Robby" 
Lanham. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing argument and the evidence submitted 
herewith, the Court should dismiss Thomas Everett Lanham's claim, 
find that Gordon Thomas Lanham fully disposed of his estate in his will 
and his audio recordings and the personal property remaining in the 
decedent's estate should be distributed by the personal representative 
at his discretion for the reasons set forth herein and as intended by 
Gordon Thomas Lanham. Further, that the Court should order that 
Thomas Everett Lanham reimburse the estate the attorney's fees 
incurred herein. 
Dated this~ay of May 2014. 
[!£~~ 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
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) _________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Gem ) 
CASE NO. CV2013-0886 
AFFIDAVIT OF CATHERINE 
LANHAM GILLIHAN 
Your Affiant, CATHERINE LANHAM GILLIHAN, having personal 
knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a retired nurse and vocational education instructor. I am the 
oldest sibling to Gordon Thomas Lanham and Judd Lanham is my first 
cousin. Our fathers operated a power line construction company 
involving the entire family in the work. 
2. Linda Louise Andrews came into the family by marriage to Rex E 
Lanham, Jr. in October, 1965 and in the mid SO's she divorced receiving 
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a marital settlement plus a future distribution. She will be receiving 
another settlement from our mother's trust. Linda continued to live ·on 
and off with our mother, Hazel Lanham. She borrowed a lot of money 
from her that has never been repaid. She had full knowledge of our 
family finances including Gordon Thomas's and knew that his finances 
were limited and that he was receiving assistance from his mother after 
he returned to the Butte. During his illness, Gordon Thomas's sons, 
nephews, grandsons, and friends were assisting him to maintain his 
equipment and repairs to his Butte property. 
3. Following Linda's divorce, she married Sam Davis and Gordon Thomas 
had married Joanne Blackwell; both were married to other people during 
much of their relationship, and did not file any joint tax returns, or have 
any financial accounts together. Gordon Thomas never introduced her to 
anyone as his wife. Linda Louise Andrews Lanham has always been 
known by this family and friends as Rex Jr. 'sex-wife. 
4. After her other ventures for her "dream" bed and breakfast were 
bankrupt, Linda built a room on the side of Gordon Thomas's house, 
knowing that the house was in structural disrepair and that it would not 
pass any commercial codes, including the water. 
5. At the same time, Linda was trying to build a similar venture on the 
family's Mexican property, knowing full well that the Mexican 
government would not accept it. The government took that property 
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and Linda returned to the border broke. Gordon Thomas borrowed 
money to go and get her and he stated "that she was yet in another 
affair" and he ended his relationship with Linda. Gordon Thomas then 
married his life-long friend, Norma de Cordova. Linda secured the 
mortgage on the property. 
6. Gordon Thomas delayed paying Linda because he had no cash flow. 
He also felt he deserved consideration for payment of the mortgage 
because he paid many of Linda's outstanding bills: her divorce from Sam 
Davis, her eye surgery, care for her terminally ill mother, and numerous 
other expenditures. 
7. When Gordon Thomas was unable to be a lineman and had limited 
work, his son, Thomas Everett agreed to pay his father for part of the 
property. Gordon Thomas quit claimed Thomas E. some 100 + acres. 
The agreement was contingent on Thomas E. selling his ranch. The sale 
failed and numerous problems "snowballed". Because there was no 
written contract Gordon Thomas received no money and Thomas E. 
listed that property for sale. Because of this transaction and because 
Thomas E. failed to pay child support or arrange for any further 
education for Joe or Robbie, and because Gordon Thomas with assist 
from myself contributed to the education of Joe and Robbie, Gordon 
Thomas felt Thomas E. needed no further distribution from the estate. 
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8. Gordon Thomas was hospitalized numerous times in the last 14 
months of his life. Linda wrote cards, telephoned, and came to the 
hospital on numerous occasions. She acted like an old friend, not a 
woman who was coerced or threated by Gordon Thomas in the past. 
She stated to him that because she still owed him, she would care for 
him in his home; an offer Gordon Thomas declined. At no time that I 
am aware of did Linda ask about payment of the mortgage or that she 
was owed more money. It is only after Gordon Thomas's death is she 
now claiming she is owed more money. 
9. I understand that Linda is now making accusations that Gordon 
Thomas threatened or coerced her into signing certain documents or he 
would distribute "personal, private, revealing photographs of Linda 
Louise Andrews. I have assisted Judd Lanham in going through Gordon 
Thomas's personal effects and all of his pictures and papers. No 
compromising materials were found. There were posed pictures like 
"glamour shots" that Linda had taken by a professional studio and 
distributed them herself. These photos have been returned to Linda. 
10. When Gordon Thomas was asked about his will, he told me that 
when he dictated his estate wishes he had been at odds with his family 
and that he was now making new distributions. He stated that if it was 
incomplete, Judd knew his wishes and that he completely trusted him to 
take care of Keith, Joe and Robbie. Gordon Thomas told me he didn't 
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put any one else in charge because of the family conflict it would cause. 
He told me he wanted Joe to be on the land and in his house to care for 
him. He had a life tenancy for the property, and that the ranch would be 
Joe's when he died. He wanted Judd to pay off Linda and take care of 
Keith, Joe, and Robbie, using his discretion, with his remaining property. 
He left an audio tape of his intentions and directions to Judd. 
ll. When Gordon Thomas was undergoing surgery or treatments, he 
was coherent and clear as to his intentions and desires. He could clearly 
recall any fact or figure we needed about getting work done around the 
place or for his finances. He was clearly able to make any and all 
decisions necessary for his future. 
The above is true to the best of my knowledge, Catherine Gillihan 
Dated this ~day of May 2014. 
Nota u l~ndfor the State of Idaho 
Residing at: >,d , Idaho 
My Commission Expires: p./19:(;11:uB 
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) _________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Gem ) 
CASE NO. CV2013-0886 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDD LANHAM 
Your Affiant, JUDD LANHAM, personal representative, having 
personal knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn upon 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Gordon Thomas Lanham and I were first cousins. Our fathers 
were brothers. We grew up together. He was the closest I would ever 
have to a little brother. We played together as children, ran a little wild 
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together as adolescents, worked in power line construction with our dads 
for several years, and spent time with our young families together 
camping and otherwise socializing. I was with Tom through his marriages 
and divorces to Colleen, JoAnn and Norma, and his relationship with 
Defendant Linda Louise Andrews. At the time of his death he was confined to 
a wheelchair and housebound. I spoke to him each day (sometimes twice a 
day) until the day before he died. 
2. Tom married his first wife, Colleen, while he was still in high school. 
They had two sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby Lanham. 
Keith has three sons and Thomas Everett has four children including, Joseph 
(Joe) Lanham and Robert (Robby) Lanham. Joe and Robby are half-brothers. 
Tom was estranged from his children. He was disappointed in the behavior 
of Keith's sons, who rarely came to visit their grandfather and only, in Tom's 
words, "when they wanted something from him." Prior to his death he was 
rebuilding his relationship with Keith. 
3. He saw his elder son, Thomas Everett, as a liar and a thief, having 
quitclaimed about 115 acres to Thomas Everett on his promise that he would 
help support Tom. Once the quitclaim deed was recorded, Thomas Everett 
abandoned Tom. He felt betrayed and saddened by Thomas Everett's words 
and actions. To say that this situation broke his heart is not an 
exaggeration. Tom was ashamed of Thomas Everett's behavior toward the 
many women in his life and his neglect of his children, particularly Joe and 
Robby. 
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4. During the last years of Tom's life, his support network was pretty much 
reduced to Joe and wife Jessica, Keith and his wife Amy, Robbie, his sister 
Cathi, a few close friends and me. Tom was especially appreciative of the 
support of his grandsons Joe and Robby. Tom saw genuine promise in them. 
He gave great credit to his sister Cathy for the way they had turned out; she 
had taken a firm hand in helping them with upbringing and schooling. Over 
the course of our discussions, Tom made it clear to me that he wanted Joe to 
have his ranch, free and clear of the mortgage to Linda, and he wanted to 
help Robby. After his experience with Thomas Everett, he wanted to be sure 
that he could live at the ranch for the rest of his life knowing that Joe and his 
wife would care for him and upon his death the ranch would be transferred, 
free and clear to his grandson, Joseph Lanham. A deed entitled Transfer on 
Death Deed was recorded to memorialize his intent, shortly before he passed 
away. 
5. Tom had a live-in relationship with Linda Louise Andrews Lanham (whose 
last name is Lanham because she was once married to Tom's older brother 
Rex Jr.). At one point in their relationship in mid-1990, Tom agreed to let 
Linda add_onto the ranch house in the hopes of turning the place into a dude 
ranch or bed and breakfast. Linda used some of her money for the project. 
To secure her investment, Tom gave Linda a mortgage on his ranch. The 
bed and breakfast idea failed, which began Tom's long and tumultuous "on-
again, off-again" relationship with Linda. As set forth in the documents filed 
in the quiet title action, Tom and Linda entered into a series of recorded 
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satisfactions and mortgages and at the time of his death Linda held a 
mortgage of $50,000.00 with 3°/o interest, payable on death. 
6. Tom died on December 5, 2013. He left a Last Will and Testament 
naming me personal representative. I did not want to be personal 
representative but Tom insisted because he predicted problems from his son 
Thomas Everett Lanham, whom he was estranged from until the day he died. 
7. Once I was appointed personal representative and because the mortgage 
was payable upon Tom's death and accruing 3% interest, and knowing it was 
Tom's desire that Joe own his ranch free and clear of further involvement 
with Linda, I attempted to satisfy Linda's mortgage. I issued a check for 
payment in the amount of $54,625.00 for the principle and approximate 
interest that had accrued from January 2011 to January 15, 2014. Linda 
refused to accept this check. 
9. As a result of Linda refusing to accept payment I initiated a quiet title 
action with, and on behalf of Joe Lanham and the estate in Gem County Case 
No. CV2014-185. In that action, Linda Andrew Lanham is claiming that 
deed to transfer the ranch to his grandson Joe Lanham is void and the ranch 
should be included this estate action. She further counterclaims in the quiet 
title action that due to threats or coercion Tom made in 2004 and 2006, she 
is owed $137,369.49, instead of $54,625.00. 
10. Once issue of payment of Linda's mortgage is settled, Tom still has 
outstanding debts and medical bills of approximately $28,354.00. The rest 
of his property, not including the ranch, consists of household goods, farm 
tools, guns, family memorabilia, an unknown distribution from the Hazel 
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Lanham trust, and 2 undeveloped forest lots at Big Creek in Valley County 
with a tax assessed value of $1620.00, although the market value may be 
much higher. 
11. According to track #9 (the entry dated March 19, 2011) of the CD 
previously submitted to the Court, Tom wanted the Big Creek property 
to be distributed as follows: 
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side of that Big Creek 
Property to Jamie Gillihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for 
leaving the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham 
and my other grandson Thomas Robert John Lanham and he is only 
eighteen and Joe is 21 so I don't know how that will work on a deed 
etc. However that works, but anyway, I'm working on what I am going 
to do with this house and 34 acres because of the $50,000 mortgage 
that Lizzie has on it, I'm thinking that Jamie can pay her mortgage for 
his 27 acres ... " 
12. I believe that this is a specific instruction. Tom wanted me to sell 
the 27 acres on the east side of the creek to Jamie Gillihan for $50,000 
and to gift the remaining 20 acres to his grandsons Joe and Rob 
Lanham, who has now reached the age of majority. Tom's sister, 
Cathy Gillihan, owns property at Big Creek and she has personal 
knowledge of the lay-out of the properties. This distribution is 
possible, unless the properties need to be listed for sale to pay for 
medical bill or further litigation in this case and the quiet title action. 
13. Much of the personal property listed in the will and by Tom on the 
CD was sold prior to his death. 
14. Tom wanted me to distribute the remaining personal property in 
kind to his various family members, and in consideration of their actions or 
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·" 
Inactions related to challenging his wlll and estate. I am prepared to make 
such distributions, unless this property needs to be sold to pay for Tom's 
medical bills or further litigation in this case and the quiet title action. 
15. Tom specifically did not want his sons Keith and Thomas Everett Lanham 
to profit from his estate and as set forth in his Last Will and Testament and 
on Tracks 7 and 8 of the CD, Jn Tom's own word, it is obvious that thls was a 
very painful and difficult decision for him to make. 
16. Keith Lanham was able to reconcile with his father before his death and 
he accepts and honors his father's wishes as set forth in his father's wlH. 
17. Thomas Everett did not have further contact with his father after 
acquiring 100+ acres by quitclaim deed and they were estranged at the time 
of Gordon Thomas Lanham's death. 
~ 
Dated this a '3day of May 2014. 
ham, Personal Representative 
~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of May 2014. 
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) _________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Gem ) 
CASE NO. CV2013-0886 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH LANHAM 
Your Affiant, KEITH LANHAM, son of Gordon Thomas Lanham, 
having personal knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn 
upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. My father, Gordon Thomas Lanham, passed away on December 5, 
2013. At the time of his death he was wheelchair bound and needed full 
time assistance so he could continue to live on his ranch. My wife and I 
live one property away and we were both working full-time. Joe was 
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working in North Dakota and he was able to help my father financially. 
His wife, Jessica, helped care for him during the last years of his life. He 
was building a small house on his property so Joe and his family could 
be closer to care for him. It was my father's intent to live on his ranch 
with Joe and his family living with him or on his property. 
2. He intended to give the ranch to Joe and he recorded a deed to 
transfer the ranch to Joe after he died. 
3. I believe and accept that my father made the specific gifts to my 
brother, Thomas Everett, and me as set forth in his Will for his own 
personal reasons and his wishes should be honored. 
4. The remainder of my father's personal property consists primarily of 
old farm and ranching equipment and vehicles, household items and 
sentimental memorabilia. These items of personal property and the lots 
at Big Creek should be distributed according to his will and his recorded 
wishes made after he executed his will. Judd Lanham is the appropriate 
person to manage and distribute my father's estate as he knows what 
my father wanted him to do. 
5. A few years ago my father quitclaimed my brother Thomas Everett 
approximately lOO+acres. This was not intended as a gift. My brother 
promised to help support my father so that he could pay his bills, 
including the mortgage to Linda Andrews Lanham. My brother 
abandoned my father after the quitclaim deed was recorded. 
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7. I reconciled with my father prior to his death. I do know that my 
father was completely estranged from my brother, Thomas Everett, at 
the time of his death on December 5, 2013. 
Dated this~day of May 2014. 
~· 
Keith by Lanham 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b fore me this ~day of May 2014. 
Notary ~ang,..for the State of Idaho 
Residi . ~ , Idaho 
My Commission Expires: Pl 11/7&1pj 
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CASE NO. CV2013-886 
CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff's, Judd Lanham, personal representative of 
the estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham and Joseph Lanham, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. Rule 56 and I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6), moves this Court to Dismiss 
Thomas Everett's Motion for Summary Judgment for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, and order Thomas Everett Lanham to pay 
Plaintiff's attorney fees and costs pursuant to LC. §12-120, §12-
121,§12-123(2)(a), I.R.C.P. 11 and Rule 54(e). 
This motion is supported by the record herein, the Affidavits of Judd 
Lanham, Keith Lanham, Catherine Lanham Gillihan, the record and file 
herein, judicial notice of the file in CV2014-187, and the Memorandum in 
CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION tnD t G lNA L 
DISMISS THOMAS EVERETT LANHAM'S CLAIMS- PAGE 1 UT\ 
78
Support of Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Dismiss, filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Dated this .rof May 2014. 
Nancy L. llahan, 
Attorney or Personal Representative 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this ~~y of May 
2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing legal document to be 
served T the individual named below in the manner indicated: 
[ ] FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION ( and email) 
Douglas E. Fleenor 
Attorney for Linda Louise Andrews 
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
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CASE NO. CV2013-886 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON MOTION AND CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
JUN 2 5 2014 
THIS MATTER came before the Court June 20, 2014 on a Motion for 
Summary judgment filed by Claimant-Petitioner Thomas Everett Lanham and 
on a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Personal 
Representative, Judd Lanham. The Court considered the filings, affidavits 
and Memoranda submitted before the hearing, and considered oral 
arguments of counsel made at the hearing. 
ORIGINAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham passed away December 5th, 
2013, after long-declining health problems. In the time leading up to his 
death, decedent met with friends and family and his attorney and discussed 
his various kinds of assets and his intent for transferring them upon his 
death. Some of those people who participated in those discussions signed 
affidavits that were included in the record. 
2. Decedent periodically dictated his thoughts into an audio 
recorder. That audio was transcribed and typed into the form of a will. 
Decedent signed the will before witnesses. Decedent's and the witnesses' 
signatures were notarized and that will was submitted for probate. 
3. Decedent made additional recordings after he executed the will. 
The audio recordings made by decedent were part of the record before the 
Court as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Judd Lanham, the Personal 
Representative. The record also included affidavits from Keith Colby Lanham 
and Cathy Lanham Gillihan, submitted by the Personal Representative. 
4. The Court finds no reason to doubt the validity of the will. From 
the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it is clear that decedent 
Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the 
time of he executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the 
extent and nature of his assets. He also demonstrated a good grasp of his 
potential heirs, and his relationships with them and sound reasons for 
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treating each as he did. There is no evidence suggesting that anyone 
exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent. In fact, in spite of 
decedent's failing health and physical maladies, it appears he was a strong 
willed and independent thinker at the time he executed the will. 1 
5. Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims, but 
he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible, 
admissible evidence. Based upon the language of the will itself, the 
affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire record, the Court finds in 
favor of the Personal Representative on every factual dispute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The will of decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham is legal, valid, and 
binding. 
2. Decedent's intent is sufficiently clear from the language of the 
will, particularly as bolstered and explained by contemporary audio 
recordings and the affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, if 
necessary, judicial enforcement. As to the claimant, Thomas Everett 
Lanham, decedent's intent is very clearly that claimant take by the will only 
one dollar ($1.00) and a bed and there is no lawful reason to frustrate 
decedent's intent. 
1. The Court notes that a court trial had been scheduled for early April on the issue 
of the will's validity but that neither claimant, Thomas Everett Lanham, Jr., nor his attorney, 
Mr. Douglas Fleenor appeared at the time and date scheduled. The Personal 
Representative's request for costs and attorney fees is pending. 
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3. There are no issues of material fact remaining to be determined 
by the Court and the Personal Representative is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law and the Court therefore GRANTS the Personal 
Representative's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ATTORNEY FESS AND COSTS 
The issue of an award of costs and attorneys fees will be taken up at 
a future time and date. 
:t"' 
so ORDERED this _J!J_ day of June, 2014. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies services of the foregoing FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS upon the following in the manner indicated. 
[ XX ] Deposit in the U.S. Mail posta-ge prepaid, addressed to: 
Douglas Fleenor 
Attorney For Claimant, 
Thomas Everett Lanham 
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[XX] Deposit in her Gem County Courthouse Mail basket: 
Nancy Callahan 
Attorney for Personal Representative, 
Judd Lanham 
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan. 
101 Canal St. 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
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Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
JUN 25 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 










CASE NO. CV2013-886 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER came before the Court June 20, 2014 on a Motion for 
Summary judgment filed by Claimant-Petitioner Thomas Everett Lanham and 
on a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Personal 
Representative, Judd Lanham. The Court considered the filings, affidavits 
and Memoranda submitted before the hearing, and considered oral 
arguments of counsel made at the hearing. The Court having entered 
written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and having 
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announced in open Court the granting of the Personal Representative's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Claimant 
Thomas Everett Gordon take nothing by his Motion for Summary Judgment; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Personal Representative's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
and the Personal Representative may continue to administer the estate in 
accord with the Decedent's intent and according to law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that consideration of an award of costs and 
fees is reserved for decision at a future time and date. 
~A. 
so ORDERED this l"f day of June, 2014. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies services of the foregoing FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS upon the following in the manner indicated. 
[ XX ] Deposit in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Douglas Fleenor 
Attorney For Claimant, 
Thomas Everett Lanham 
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[ XX ] Deposit in her Gem County Courthouse Mail basket: 
Nancy Callahan 
Attorney for Personal Representative, 
Judd Lanham 
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan. 
101 Canal St. 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
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CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
This memorandum is respectfully submitted to the Court in 
support of the Personal Representatives Motion for Attorney's fees filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
Facts 
This action is an informal probate of the estate of Gordon Thomas 
Lanham. The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham 
specifically provided for his sons Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham to 
each receive a dollar and a bed made by their grandfather. The children 
of Keith Lanham were specifically disinherited. The Last Will and 
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Testament was transcribed from a recording made by the testator over a 
period of time. On or about November 19, 2013 the testator executed a 
Transfer on Death Deed of his ranch naming his grandson, Joe Lanham, 
grantee-beneficiary, subject to payment of a mortgage to his former 
girlfriend, Linda Louise Andrews Lanham, a/k/a Linda Louise Andrews. 
Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5, 2013. The original Will 
was filed with the Court on December 20, 2013 and Judd Lanham was 
informally appointed personal representative. 
On January 8, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, a son, filed pro se a 
pleading he titled "Application to Attest Personal Representative" that 
included claims that the Will was not valid and that the personal 
representative was not qualified. 
On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham, by and through his attorney 
William F. Lee, filed a Petition to Remove Personal Representative with 
claims contesting the validity of the Will and requesting removal of the 
Personal Representative. The matters were set for hearing on January 
21, 2014. 
On or about January 15, 2014, the Personal Representative 
attempted to satisfy the mortgage to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham in 
the amount of $54,625.00 from funds left to the Personal 
Representative in a POD account. He was instructed by the decedent 
prior to his death that decedent intended that Joe Lanham would take 
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the ranch free and clear of any encumbrances. Linda Andrews Lanham 
refused to accept payment of the mortgage. 
On January 21, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, pro se, and Keith 
Lanham with his attorney, William F. Lee, were present in Court. The 
Personal Representative, Judd Lanham was present with counsel. Also 
present were the two witnesses to the decedent's will, Rebecca Clift, 
notary, Cathy Gillihan, sister of the decedent, and other family 
members. This Court advised the parties that two matters were before 
the Court; the issue of removal of the Personal Representative and the 
validity of the Will. The Court advised the parties that it was not inclined 
to remove the Personal Representative and that the matters concerning 
the construction of the will were continued for a half day trial on April 2, 
2014. 
On March 5, 2014 the Personal Representative and Joe Lanham 
filed a Quiet Title action in Gem County Case No. 2014-185 due to Linda 
Andrews' refusal to accept satisfaction of the mortgage. 
On March 24, 2014 Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in 
this, the estate case on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham. Fleenor filed 
a Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will 
and Determining Heirs and a Petition of Order Restraining Personal 
Representative. These Petitions were nearly identical to the Petition filed 
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by Mr. Lee on behalf of Keith Lanham. Mr. Fleenor set a hearing on the 
Petitions for April 3, 2014 at 11 :00. 
On March 28, 2014 the Personal Representative, Judd Lanham, 
filed his affidavit and distributed a copy of the audio decedent recorded 
for his Will document and continued recording after the execution of his 
Will, in order to provide further instructions for the distribution of his 
property. 
On March 28, 2014, William F. Lee, on behalf of Keith Lanham, 
withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal Representative and his claim 
contesting the validity of the Will. 
On April 2, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham and his attorney Mr. 
Fleenor failed to appear for the Court trial to construe or determine the 
validity of the Will. 
On April 3, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham appeared with his counsel, 
Douglas Fleenor, for hearing on their Petition for Order Removing 
Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and the 
Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court 
reviewed the record and arguments of counsel and denied the petition 
and awarded the estate attorney's fees. Subsequent affidavits for fees 
and objections were filed and the matter of fees incurred through April 3 
is still pending. 
On April 9, 2014 Attorney Fleenor, as counsel for Linda Louise 
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Andrews, filed an Answer and Counterclaim in the quiet title action 
alleging the deed transferring the ranch to Joe Lanham was void and the 
ranch should be included in the residual estate of Gordon Thomas 
Lanham. Linda Louis Andrews further claimed that the decedent had 
committed fraud on two separate occasions and that instead of 
$50,000.00 plus interest, the decedent owed her to $137,369.46 based 
upon a December 17, 2002 mortgage. 
On April 23, 2014 Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in this probate case on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham 
claiming that the Will fails to make any dispositive provisions and fails to 
give direction regarding the residue of his father's estate. Fleenor's and 
Thomas Everett Lanham's Motion for Summary Judgment also claimed 
that the residual estate should pass intestate to decedent's heirs. These 
were the very same issues and arguments Mr. Fleenor and Thomas 
Everett Lanham had earlier raised in the Petition for Order Removing 
Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs which 
was already denied by the court on April 3rd, 2014. The summary 
judgment motion did not include any supporting affidavits or evidence. 
The estate filed its cross motions for summary judgment in both 
pending matters supported by affidavits, and memoranda on May 23, 
2014. 
At the hearing before This Court on the motion and the cross-
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motion for summary judgment, Mr. Fleenor produced no evidence. 
Fleenor argued that the will did not make any dispositive provisions 
(except for a sheep's head) or give direction regarding the residue of his 
father's estate and that decedent's property should pass intestate to 
decedent's heirs. These arguments were contradicted by the affidavits 
and evidence produced by the estate. The estate was granted its Cross 
Motion For Summary Judgment. The Court reserved the issues of 
attorney's fees. 
Argument 
The Will document and the audio of Gordon Thomas Lanham 
specifically disinherited his sons by giving them each 1.00 and a bed 
made by their grandfather. Thomas E. Lanham was present in Court on 
January 21, 2014 when the Court declined to remove the personal 
representative1 and set the trial date for a 1/2 day trial to construe the 
will. The trial was set in open Court for April 2, 2014. 
Thomas E. Lanham either failed to disclose to his attorney or did 
not understand what happened at the January 21, 2014 hearing when 
the Y2 day court trial was set. The failure of Mr. Fleenor and his client to 
I. To the best recollection of counsel and without the benefit of a transcript, the Court announced 
the Court was "not inclined" to remove the Personal Representative. The Personal Representative 
and his counsel understood the Court to be saying, This is not a final decision and I have an open 
mind about the issue. However, unless I see something more or different, I see no good reason to 
overturn the Decedent's choice for Personal Representative. The Personal Representative submits 
that anyone of average intelligence would understand the Court's comments the same way. In other 
words, when Thomas Everett Lanham and Mr. Fleenor repeated the request to remove the Personal 
Representath·e and supplied no new evidence or argument, they were, or should have been, on notice 
they were wasting the Court's and the Personal Representative's time and pointlessly increasing the 
costs of litigation. 
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appear for trial on April 2, 2014 was inexcusable neglect and caused the 
estate to incur additional expense. 
The history of this case shows that Attorney Fleenor failed to make 
an investigation into the facts of this case to learn that a court trial was 
pending on April 2, 2014. Further, a minimal investigation into the facts 
by listening to the recorded audio of the brief hearing held on January 
21, 2014, Fleenor and his client would have learned that, based upon 
the pleadings filed by Mr. Lee on behalf of Keith Lanham, the court was 
not inclined to remove the personal representative, in addition to 
learning of the court trial on April 2, 2014. It further appears that the 
subsequent Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, 
Construing Will, and Determining Heirs filed by Mr. Fleenor, are nearly 
copies of the pleadings filed by Mr. Lee and considered by the Court at 
the January hearing when the court declined to remove the personal 
representative. Keith Lanham after receiving a copy of the CD of his 
father's recorded instruction withdrew his petition to contest the will on 
March 28,2014. 
On April 2, 2014, the estate was prepared to proceed to trial. 
Witnesses were present and prepared to testify and defend the 
construction of the will, if necessary. Thomas E. Lanham and his 
attorney failed to appear. On April 3, 2014 Thomas E. Lanham and his 
attorney did appear in court, and again the personal representative and 
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witnesses were prepared to present testimony, if necessary. Mr. Fleenor 
had a copy of the CD of decedent's further instructions to the personal 
representative about the disposition of his remaining property, but did 
not address it. At the time of the April 3rd hearing Attorney Fleenor did 
not present any evidence in support the claims made in the petition. 
Based upon the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the court again 
declined to remove the personal representative and declared that the 
Will was sufficiently clear for administration of the estate. The Court 
recognized that decedent left Thomas Everett Lanham $1.00 and a bed 
made for him by his grandfather, denied the petition and awarded 
attorney's fees and costs to the Personal Representative. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying 4 page 
memorandum filed on behalf of Thomas E. Lanham on April 23, 2014 
was filed simultaneously with a Motion for Summary Judgment in the 
quiet title action,2 shifting the burden under I.R.C.P. 56(e) to the non-
moving party, the Personal Representative, to go beyond pleadings 
2. Attorney Fleenor also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the quiet title action, failing to provide 
any admissible evidence to support his claims. Hearings on the two Motions for Summary Judgment were 
held on June 10, 2014: the first at 9:00 o'clock A.M. before District Court Judge, George A. Southworth in 
the Quiet Title action, and the other before this Court at 11 :00 o'clock A.M. Judge Southworth ruled from 
the bench granting the estate and Joseph Lanham summary judgment. Judge Southworth found that 1) 
Defendant failed to adequately plead either the defense of fraud or a counterclaim of fraud by failing to 
identify any of the 9 elements required to set forth a fraud claim; 2) failed to provide any admissible facts 
or evidence bearing on the legitimacy of Linda Andrews' oral claims that she was defrauded, and 
defendant's statements were barred by the Dead Man's Statute; 3) Defendant's claim that she was owed an 
additional $50,000, even ifthere ever was such an oral contact the Statute of Limitations had run and as for 
the claim for the $50,000.00 as it related to the real property, that claim was barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. The Court found that the defendant failed to produce any admissible or written evidence to 
substantiate her claims. 
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through affidavit, depositions, etc., to demonstrate that there are 
genuine issue of material fact, increasing the expense to the estate. 
This Motion for Summary Judgment was just another attempt to have 
the Court construe the Will on essentially the same grounds as the 
Petition that was previously denied essentially alleging the only 
dispositive gift made in the will was a "sheep's head that Judd can hang 
in his cabin" and that the will did not dispose of decedent's residuary 
estate and the remainder of decedent's property should pass intestate to 
his heirs. At the time of filing the motion, Mr. Fleenor and his client had 
the audio recording of the decedent that further identified and instructed 
the personal representative concerning the disposition of decedent's 
property, and they simply ignored its existence. As a result, the burden 
shifted to the estate to produce evidence and affidavits concerning the 
decedent's intent and prepare a cross motion for summary judgment. 
At the hearing on Thomas Everett Lanham's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, this Court again found that the Will was valid and that 
Decedent's intent was sufficiently clear and explained by contemporary 
audio recordings to allow administration and, if necessary, judicial 
enforcement. The court also found that although Thomas Everett 
Lanham advanced several claims, he failed to support his claims and 
arguments with one iota of admissible or credible evidence. The Court 
also confirmed that Thomas E. Lanham was to receive $1.00 and a bed 
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that was made by his grandfather. 
The Personal Representative urges the court to consider sanctions 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 11(a)(1) for Mr. Fleenor's failure to conduct a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and record to filing the pleadings in 
this case. 
The focus of Rule 11 is to prevent pleading abuses. It states: 
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions.--
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of record 
of the state of Idaho, in his individual name, whose address shall be 
stated before the same may be filed .... The signature of an attorney 
or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading, motion or 
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include 
an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
What Mr. Fleenor did know at the time he filed his initial pleadings 
was that the decedent specifically gave Thomas Everett Lanham $1.00 
and a bed made by his grandfather. He had a duty to make a 
reasonable inquiry grounded in fact from his client, the court record, or 
other sources to determine the status of the case and what issues were 
on the table including pending trial dates. Nothing presented to date 
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has indicated that Mr. Fleenor ever had any admissible evidence to 
support any claim in his Petition for Order Removing Personal 
Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs or the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Sanctions should also apply because after the Court determined 
that the will was valid on April 3, 2014, Mr. Fleenor filed a motion for 
summary judgment on behalf of his client again challenging the will by 
claiming that the will did not dispose of the decedent's residuary estate 
and that the property should pass by intestacy. At the time that this 
Motion and Memorandum was filed Mr. Fleenor had access to the audio 
recording where the decedent specifically disinherited Thomas Everett 
Lanham by leaving him $1.00 and the bed made for him by his 
grandfather. As a result of this filing, the burden shifted to the estate to 
again defend the validity of the will and the decedent's intent to 
disinherit his sons, caused needless expense and increased the cost of 
this litigation. 
Mr. Fleenor should share joint and severable liability with his client 
for the attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
Mr. Fleenor and his client should be ordered to pay the estate 
attorney's fees and costs because the estate has been the prevailing 
party on all issues and claims raised by Mr. Fleenor and his client. 
The Court has the discretion to award attorney fees and costs to 
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the prevailing party. The exercise of that discretion is guided by I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(1)(B) which provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall 
in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result 
of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion 
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a 
fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant 
judgment or judgments obtained. 
"[T]here are three principal factors the trial court must consider 
when determining which party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final 
judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) 
whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and 
(3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed one each of the 
claims or issues." Sanders v. Lankford 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823, 
826 (Ct.App. 2000). The "result obtained" may be the product of a 
court judgment or a settlement reached by the parties. Jerry J. Joseph 
C.L.U. Assoc. vs. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 5557, 789 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(Ct.App.1990); Ladd v. Coats, 105 Idaho 250, 602 P.2d 126 
(Ct.App.1983). 
The Court has the discretion to award attorney's fees and costs 
in this case pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121 because Thomas Everett 
Lanham, by or through his attorney, failed to provide any credible 
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evidence to support the claims and his contest of the will through the 
motion for summary judgment was frivolous and without foundation. 
Thomas E. Lanham had been effectively disinherited by his father for 
good and sufficient reasons as set forth in the Affidavits of Judd 
Lanham, Cathy Lanham Gilihan, and Keith Lanham. 
Idaho Code § 12-121, states in relevant part: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided 
that this section shall not alter, repeal, or amend any 
statute which otherwise provides for the award of 
attorney's fees. 
Attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-121 "may be awarded by 
the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Moreover, "[a]ttorney fees 
are not appropriate under I.C. §12-121 and I.C.R.P. 54(e) unless all 
claims brought are frivolous and without foundation." Bingham v. 
Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999). 
The decision to award attorney fees under I.C. §12-121 rests in the 
sound discretion of the district court and will only be reversed where 
there is an abuse of discretion. Bingham. 
Whenever the court awards attorney fees pursuant to section 
§12-121 the court must make a written finding, either in the award or 
in a separate document, as to the basis and reasons for awarding such 
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attorney fees. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). As set forth above there are ample 
reasons for awarding attorney1s fees pursuant 12-121. 
If the Court is inclined to award attorney's fees, the calculation 
of the award of attorney fees is committed to the sound discretion of 
the District Court. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 
110 (2005). The rules require the district court to consider all eleven 
factors plus any other factor deemed appropriate. Lettunich, 141 
Idaho at 435, 111 P.3d at 120 (citing Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit 
Ass 1n v. Netbaur, 113 Idaho 402, 987 P.2d 314 (1999). However, in 
Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 
614, 618 (2007), it noted that "the court need not specifically address 
all of the factors contained in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long as 
the record clearly indicates the Court considered them all." (quoting 
Boe/ v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775 
(2002)). 
The pertinent factors that this court should consider 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) are: 
(A) The time and labor required 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly and the experience and ability of the 
attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS- PAGE 14 
101
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstance of the case 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) Reasonable cost of automated research 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate 
in the particular case. 
As set forth above, the estate has been the prevailing party on all 
issues raised by Thomas Everett Lanham and propounded by his 
attorney. 
The Court should also consider an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho §12-123(2)(a) which states: 
In accordance with the provisions of this section, at any 
time prior to the commencement of the trial in a civil 
action or within twenty one (21) days after the entry of 
judgment in a civil action, the court may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely 
affected by frivolous conduct. 
Idaho Code §12-123 (l)(b) addresses the definition of "Frivolous 
Conduct" as it applies in this case: "Frivolous conduct" means conduct 
of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that satisfies 
either of the following: 
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i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously 
injure another party to a civil action; 
ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under 
existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law. 
In this case the Court had previously considered the issue 
of removal of the personal representative in January 2014. At 
that time Thomas Everett Lanham was representing himself. Mr. 
Fleenor entered his appearance in March 2014. An interview with 
his client or a review of the court audio would have informed Mr. 
Fleenor that that issue of removing the personal representative 
had been determined by the Court on January 21, 2014. A 
review of the Idaho Repository reveals a Court Trial on April 2, 
2104, and again, a review of the court audio would reflect that it 
was a 1h day trial on the issue of the construction of the will. The 
pleadings filed on behalf of Thomas E. Lanham, signed by Mr. 
Fleenor, on March 24, 2014, alleged the same or similar facts as 
set forth in a petition filed by Keith Lanham, which Keith Lanham 
later withdrew. At no time has Thomas Everett Lanham or his 
attorney, Mr. Fleenor advanced any admissible evidence to 
support any claims or allegations made by or on behalf of his 
client. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm 
the award of attorney's fees previously ordered on the record on 
April 3, 2014, and order that Mr. Douglas E. Fleenor his client, 
Thomas Everett Lanham, are jointly and severally liable for 
reimbursement to the estate in the sum of $2397.50 for fees 
incurred from March 25, 2014 through and including April 3, 
2014, and further order joint and several liability for fees 
incurred by the estate in having to defend the motion for 
summary judgment in the sum of $8050.00 as set forth on the 
Affidavit of In Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees submitted 
contemporaneously herewith. 
Dated this _!l__ day ot July 2014. 
a lahan, 
s for Personal Representative 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS- PAGE 17 
104
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this~ day of 
July 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing legal 
document to be served upon the individual named below in the manner 
indicated: 
[ ] FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
Douglas E. Fleenor 
Attorney for Thomas Everett Lanham 
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
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. , . 
Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
.-- I I ~L~ f9 JJi.  F.M. 
IJUL o 9 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 









CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW, JUDD LANHAM, personal representative, by and 
through his attorneys of record, THE LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. 
CALLAHAN, and hereby moves this Court for the entry of an Order for 
Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to LC. §12-120, §12-121,§12-
123(2)(a), I.R.C.P. 11 and Rule 54(e). 
This motion is made and based upon the court files and the 
Affidavit for Attorney's Fees and Costs and supporting memorandum 
submitted herewith. 
DATED this _!lt_ da . 
Nancy L llahan, . n R \ 1"" \ ~ l /\ \ 
Attorne s for Personal Representat1~ l \ I tJ ' • \l · ' "'-· 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this <I- day 
of July 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing legal 
document to be served upon the individuals named below in the 
manner indicated: 
[ v('FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
Douglas E. Fleenor 
Attorney for Thomas Everett 
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
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Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Defendant 
,~ 1 A.k ffl)9.u. 
JUL r 9 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 









CASE NO. CV2013-886 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
Your Affiant, NANCY L. CALLAHAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. That your Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for the above named 
Defendant and has personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein; 
2. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference, is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's attorney fee billing 
incurred in this matter related to the Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on behalf of Thomas Everett on April 23, 2014. The charges set 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FE~A'II~ 1 t.~ I l\ I 
COSTS- PAGE 1 LJ l~ I lJ I i 'l r, L 
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forth on Exhibit "A" were incurred by the estate of Gordon Thomas 
Lanham as a result of Attorney Fleenor on behalf of Thomas E. Lanham 
filing a Motion for Summary Judgment without supporting admissible 
evidence from the date of filing the motion on April 23, through and 
including July 9, 2014 for the preparation of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Attorney's fees and Costs and supporting documents in the total sum 
of $8050.00. 
3. On April 3, 2014 court awarded the estate attorney's fees, as a result 
previous proceedings. The estate incurred the total sum of $2397.50 
from March 25, 2014 through and including April 3, 2014 as and for 
fees. The matter of the amount of fees has yet not been determined. 
There were no costs incurred. The total attorney's fees in defending 
the petitions and motions filed by Mr. Fleenor and Thomas E. Lanham 
are $10,447.50. 
4. Your Affiant is an attorney duly licensed and practicing in the State of 
Idaho with offices located at 101 Canal Street, Emmett, Idaho, and is 
the attorney for the personal representative of the estate of Gordon 
Thomas Lanham. 
5. Your Affiant has represented the personal representative upon an 
agreed hourly rate of $175.00 per hour in .2 increments of an hour. 
The rate for the same or similar work is $200.00 to $300.00 per hour. 
Your Affiant has reviewed the attached Exhibit "A" of attorney fees and 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
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costs incurred by the estate and believes that the charges reflected on 
Exhibit "A" are reasonable for representation in this matter. 
DATED this !;t__ day of Jul 2014. 
a lahan, 
s for Personal Representative 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me the undersigned Notary 
Public in and ~.state of on this ___1_~ of July 2014. 
s""_. l,,. QUEN ,,,,, 
~·"_ ,.~~ .......... <'-6' .. 1/',, '"".- ... ,..~ I ~I,- 0 -tAR t ··-,_ \ 
: ~ . -
i i -·- j E Residing at: ~..LJ4...L.!C~I,,£...._,_ 
\ '. Pus'-f, l 5 Commission xpires: 
ill! •• • " • ...#,..1--#-1,'--+-,µ.6...:,:;_;,_-'J'---
~ -" .. .. ,.,.., .. ) ,• 
~,,. .... ,.. •••••••• ">--'' .-' ,,,,~,7'Eof \'-:~·· CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......... , 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this ~day of July 
2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing legal document to be 
served upon the following named individual in the manner indicated: 
[ ~ACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
Douglas E. Fleenor -
Attorney for Thomas Everett Lanham 
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
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- ' Exhibit A 
04/23/14 Receive and review motion[s] for summary 0.5 
judgment, both cases. Scan and email to client. 
(time split) 
04/28/14 Research summary judgment rules and case law. 0.9 
1.8 total, Y2 to estate case Y2 to quiet title, due to 
simultaneous motions. Response due May 23 in 
both cases. Calendar due dates. 
04/29/14 Telephone call to Judd, email to Cathy, research 3.5 
Case law re: residuary estate, etc. 
05/06/14 Work on estate memo 1.5 
05/22/14 Work on work on affidavits, meeting with Keith, 2.0 
Meeting with Cathy. (split with quiet title) 
05/23/14 Finalize Memo and Affidavits, draft cross Motion 5.7 
For Summary Judgment. Prep documents for filing 
and filing, scan, email and fax to Fleenor. 
06/10/14 1 hour wait, Attend court, meeting with clients re: 2.5 
What happened in court. 
06/11/14 Review audio in estate case 0.5 
06/12/14 Further review of audio, begin drafting findings. 2.0 
06/13/14 Continue drafting findings 0.4 
06/16/14 Continue working on findings 1.8 
06/18/14 Finalize court documents and filing 0.9 
06/23/14 Review Motion to reconsider filed by Fleenor, scan 0.4 
and fax to Judd 
06/26/14 Receive, scan and email findings of fact and 1.2 
Judgment. Begin research on attorney's fees and Rule 11 
Sanctions (Split between quiet title action) 
07/01/14 Continue research attorney's motion, 2.0 (split with 3.8 
Quiet title action. Begin drafting attorney's fees motion 




07 /02/14 Continue work on memo 3.5 
07 /03/14 Draft of memo to Rolf for major editing. Begin 1.5 
Separating estate case time from quiet title time from 
Prior billings. (Time split between estate case and 
Quiet title action, total 3.0). RMK proof and begin editing 
Estate Memo. 1.9 
07 /04/14 RMK edits from home computer 1.5 
07/06/14 RMK Revisions and edits estate memo from home 3.2 
computer 
07 /07 /14 Complete separating time from quiet title action (split 0. 7 
Between estate case and quiet title total 1.5) RMK continue 
editing. 2.10 2.8 
07 /09/14 Finalize affidavit, prep final documents, and filing 4.0 
46.0 




Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attomey & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-472-8846 
208-947-5910 fax 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
F I A.~tfr;~ 
AUil l 6 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF AND ms ATTORNEY OF RECORD 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, appeals the Decision and Order of the Magistrate Court in 
this matter as follows: 
1. Petitioner appeals from the Order of the Magistrate Court in and for the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Gem. 
2. Petitioner makes this appeal to the District Court for the Third Judicial District. 
3. Petitioner appeals the Magistrate's Order in this matter dated June 25, 2014 and 
entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
4. This appeal is taken upon matters of law. 
5. The hearings in this matter were recorded. The tape recordings of the hearings are 
in the possession of the Clerk of the Court of Gem County. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
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6. Issues Appellant asserts on appeal will be stated in a Statement of Issues on Appeal 
which will be filed by Defendant pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(f)(6), but which will include: 
a. The Will of the Decedent is clear and plain. The intent of the Decedent 
should not be bolstered and explained by parole evidence 
b. A plain reading of the Will establishes that the Decedent did not dispose of 
the residue of his estate. 
c. Other issues as may be determined during the course of this appeal. 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this\]"' day of August, 201~ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the l 5:aay o~~ 4, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be forwarded to the following person(s): 
Nancy Callahan 
1 01 Canal Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attorney & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-4 72-8846 
208-947-5910 fax 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
_!_~-~ #.-o~ 
JUL 3 l 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Thomas Lanham, by and through his attorney of record, 
Douglas E. Fleenor, and objects to the Personal Representative's Motion For Attorney Fees and 
Costs dated July 9, 2014, for the following reasons: 
1. Petitioner did not bring a claim frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; 
2. The claimed attorney fees are excessive and should be reduced to a reasonable 
amount. 
Petitioner, Thomas Lanham, has previously objected to the Personal Representative's 
Motion for Attorney's fees filed regarding fees in connection with the hearing on April 2, 2014, 
and incorporated that objection herein. Again, counsel apologizes for the misunderstanding, but 
believed the hearing noticed by Keith Lanham had been vacated. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ~ 1 
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Petitioner brought a motion on April 3, 2014, requesting this court restrain the Personal 
Representative in accordance with LC. § 15-3-607. Petitioner brought that motion with good 
foundation, stating the Personal Representative had been giving away property, some of which 
was irreplaceable. This Court heard the argument and decided to deny Petitioner's motion. This 
Court did not consider or hear arguments on removing the Personal Representative, construing 
the Will, or Determining Heirs as stated by the Personal Representative in his Motion for 
attorney fees. 
On April 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming the Will 
did not contain dispositive provisions. This issue is an issue oflaw, not facts. Since the Will had 
been admitted to this Court, the Court need only read the Will to determine whether it contained 
dispositive provisions. 
The issue in the Motion for Summary Judgment was whether the Will properly disposed 
of decedent's property, which is not the same issue of restraining the Personal Representative 
heard previously, or of removing the Personal Representative, construing the Will, or 
Determining Heirs, which have not yet been heard by the Court, contrary to the Personal 
Representative's listing of facts in his Motion for attorney fees. 
Although this Court stated that a higher court might find otherwise, the Court ruled that it 
could consider parole evidence in determining the intent of the decedent, the decedent's intent 
was to allow his Personal Representative to distribute his estate as the Personal Representative 
saw fit. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment Was Not Frivolous, Unreasonable, Or Without 
Foundation. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2 
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IRCP Rule 54(e) states that, 11attorney fees under section 12-121 Idaho Code, may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
The Personal Representative argues that LC. § 12-121 should apply because the 
Petitioner did not provide credible evidence to support his motion for summary judgment. 
However, like many motions for summary judgment, Petitioner's motion was based on law and 
facts already in the record. Thus, there was no need for additional evidence. 
The Legal Charges Claimed By The Personal Representative Are Excessive. 
The personal representative claims 46 hours for a simple question of whether a Will 
contains dispositive provisions is excessive. 
For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Personal Representative's 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this "'.s O ~ July, 2014. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the Q day of July, 2014) I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) 
indicated below, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Callahan 
101 Canal Street 
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P• 
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho. in and for the County of Gem 
Case No. CV-2013-886 
The Honorable Tyler D. Smith presiding 
Patrick J. Geile 
Matthew G. Bennett 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC 
953 S. Industzy Way 
P.O. Box 10 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Attor.neys for Appellant 
Nancy L. Callahan 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
101 Can.al Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
Attorney for Appellee 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Did the magistrate court correctly find that the will was sufficiently clear to allow 
administration of the estate when it used inadmissible extrinsic evidence to detennine 
intent and ignored statutory rules of construction to create a residuary clause? 
2. Did the magistrate court correctly find that Thomas E. Lanham should only receive $1.00 
and a bed where there is no residual clause in the will and intestate laws dictate that 
property not effectively disposed of passes by intestacy? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gordon Thomas Lanham ("hereinafter Testator") died December 5. 2013. In the time 
leading Up to his death, the Testator dictated his thoughts into an audio recorder. A portion of 
these thoughts were transcribed and signed by the Testator and two witnesses. This document 
was submitted to the probate court as his will. 
The will appoints Judd Lanham ("hereinafter Personal Representative") as Personal 
Representative of the estate and directs him to distribute ''the property and personal effects [of 
the testator] in any way that he sees fit." The Testator was particularly concerned with the 
appointment of the Personal Representative and restates the appoin1ment several times 
throughout the will. 
. The "Will initially states that Thomas E. Lanham ''has already been given all he needs to 
have" and gives him "$1 more dollar against whatever is legal to him." However. the will 
subsequently states that "a smaller [bed} in the other bedroom belongs to my son, Tom." Apart 
from these provisions, the will describes the real and personal property of the Testator, but it 
does not state who is to receive the property. The will does not contain a residuary clause. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A court reviews an order granting s~ judgment using the same standard as the 
district court ruling on the motion. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751 (2006) .. Summary 
1 
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judgment is appropriate when ''the pleadings. depositions, affidavits and admissions on file show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." Id. Further, the record is to be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Carl H. 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866. 870 (1999). The appellate court 
exercises free review on appeal. Id. 
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court "will consider only the material 
contained in affidavits or depositions which is based upon personal knowledge and which would 
be admissible at trial." Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869 (1969). The 
admissibility of material is a threshold question that is made before the reasonable inferences 
standard is applied. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 784 (1992). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MAGISTRATE COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT .THE 
TESTATOR'S INTENT WAS "SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR" TO ALLOW 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE WILL 
A. The Magistr-ate Court improl!erly considered extrinsic evidence that alters and 
varies the Testator's intent as expressed in the will. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the "intention of a testator as expressed in 
his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions [and that] [t]he language of [a] will is to be 
given its ordinary and well understood meaning." .A.lien v. Shea, l 05 Idaho 31, 3 2 ( 1983 ). 
Where the language in a will is miambiguous, the court determines the testator's intent only from 
the document itself. In re Estare of Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474. 475 (1985). Where a will is 
ambiguous, however, the court may ascertain the testator's intent through the use of extrinsic 
evidence. Id. Such extrinsic evidence cannot be used to "alter, vary or add to (the] written 
instrument." Nielsen v. Nielsen, 93 Idaho 419,422 (1969) (emphasis added). 
2 
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While the interpretation of the testator's intent is a question of fact, the determination of 
ambiguity is a question of law. In re Estate of Berriochoa, 108 474,475 (1985); Montgomery v. 
Montgomery, 147 ldaho 1, 8 (2009). Ambiguities can either be patent or latent. Swanson v. 
Beco Const. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62 (2007). To detennine whether a patent ambiguity exists, the 
court looks at the document as a whole and gives the words and phrases their legal or commonly 
used meaning. Buku Props., LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 832 (2012). A patent ambiguity 
exists when a phrase is susceptible to "two different reasonable interpretations or the language is 
nonsensical." Id (citing Potlach Educ. Ass 'n. v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 633 (2010)). 
In this case, the will contains many patent ambiguities. For example, the will ·states that 
47 acres of property in Big Creek, Idaho should be administered "1/2 to one person and 1/2 to 
another," but fail~ to identify who these people are. The will also identifies guns and other 
personal property, but fails to identify who should receive each item of personal property with 
the exception of some furniture. These phrases are both nonsensical and subj'ect to multiple 
interpretations, and are, therefore, patently ambiguous. Because of these patent ambiguities, a 
court may use ex~insic evidence that doesn't vary or add to the will in order to determine the 
testator's intent. · 
Here, the··magistrate court considered extrinsic evidence which adds to and varies the 
language expressed in the will. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Motion and 
CrosswMotion for Summary Judgment, the magistrate court stated that the Testator's "intent is 
sufficiently clear from the language of the will, particularly as bolstered by contemporary audio 
recordings and the affidavits submitted. to allow administraiion.'' However, the language of the 
wil1 coupled with properJy considered extrinsic evidence neither establishes the testator's intent 
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For example, extrinsic evidence regarding the above mentioned Big Creek property 
showed intent to pass the property to three people instead of two. The audio recordings 
considered by the magistrate court state that "My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side 
of the Big Creek Property to Jamie Gillihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for leaving 
the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham and my other grandson Thomas 
Robert John Lanham." This extrinsic evidence varies and adds to the will, and is inadmissible to 
determine the testator's intent. Moreover, without this inadmissible extrinsic evidence, it is 
impossible to determine the testator's intent as to which two people should receive the Big Creek 
Property. 
The disposition of much of the Testator's personal property contains similar flaws that 
cannot be reconciled through the use of admissible extrinsic evidence. Therefore, the magistrate 
court improperly considered extrinsic evidence when it found that Testator's intent was 
sufficiently clear to allow administration of the est.ate. 
B. The statutory rules of construction dictate that property: that is not effectively 
disnosed of passes through intestate succession. 
Where a testator's intent cannot be detennined by the language of the will or extrinsic 
evidence, a. "co~ may resort t(! rules of construction to interpret the document" In re Estate of 
Berriochoa, 108 474, 475 (1985). The statutory rules of construction are found at Idaho Code 
sections 15-2-601 through 15-2-616. These rules apply "unless a contrary intention is indicated 
by the will.,, Idaho Code § 15-2-603 (2014). Where possible, a will is construed to pass all of a 
testator's property. Idaho Code§ 15-2-604 (2014). However, ''if a devise ... fails for any 
reason, it b~omes a part of the residue." Idaho Code§ 15-2-606 (2014). 
When the residue or any other part of a testator's estate is not effectively disposed of, it 
passes to a decedent's heirs according to the laws of intestate succession. Idaho Code § 15-2-
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101 (2014). Further, "[i]f it becomes evident in the course of a fonnal testacy proceeding that 
though one (1) or more instruments are entitled to be probated, the decedent's estate is or may be 
partially intestate, the court shall enter an order to that effect." Idalw Code§ 15w341 l (2014). 
For a case without a surviving spouse, all intestate propeny passes "[t]o the issue of the 
decedent; if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent they take equally, but if of 
unequal degree, then those of more remote degree take by representation." Idaho Code§ 15-2-
103. 
Wills are generally interpreted to avoid intestacy, but only where such will "evinces an 
intention to dispose of the entire estate.'· In re Estate of Corwin, 86 Idaho I, 8 (1963). In 
instances where a court attempts to avoid intestacy, "the court is not pennitted to place on the 
will any construction not expressed in it, and which is based on supposition as to the intention of 
the testator in the disposition of his estate.•• Id. Moreover, to give effect to bequests in a will the 
devisees must be ascertainable and definite. See Yrtbar v. Fitzparrick, 91 ldaho 105, 108 (1966). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that where a will passes property to an indefinite 
beneficiary, the provision is invalid for failing to adequately designate a beneficiary. Yribar v. 
Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho I 05 (I 966). In that case, the testator left the residue of his estate to "some 
worthy, charitable or public institution to be selected by my executors and my attorney acting 
jointly." The court found that such bequest did not satisfy the requirement of a beneficiary being 
designated. with reasonable certainty and upheld the trial court's decision to invalidate a portion 
of the will. Id 
In a similar case, the Idaho Supreme Court invalidated a residuary clause in a will that 
gave the executor an ''unlimited power of selection of the beneficiaries." Hedin v. Westdala 
Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241, 250 (1938). In invalidating the residuary clause, the court noted 
5 
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that while a testator can devise and bequeath his property he may not "delegate to another the 
power to make such disposition for him." Id 
· Conversely, the Idaho Supreme Court did not invalidate a clause where the beneficiaries 
were sufficiently designated. In re Estate of Eggan, 86 Idaho 328, 340 (1963). In that case, the 
court found that a will giving the City of Moscow the residue to be used for "the youth of this 
area" was sufficiently definite to designate a class of beneficiaries. Id. at 331. In reaching its 
decision, the court upheld the court's decision in Hedin and noted the invalidity of a bequest 
where it is too vague and indefinite or gives the executor/trustee the right to .choose beneficiaries. 
Id at 338. 
In this case, large portions of the will are invalid because they fail to adequately designate 
a beneficiary. Extrinsic evidence and the rules of construction do not correct this inadequacy. 
Similar to the testator in Ytibar and Hedin. the testator in this case directs the executor to 
"distribute my property and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit." This provision is 
invalid under Idaho precedent because it both gives the executor an unlimited power to designate 
beneficiaries and fails to identify any beneficiaries with reasonable certainty. This is not a case 
like Eggan where a bequest was made~ a definite class of persons. Instead, the will in this case 
fails to identify beneficiaries and attempts to provide the executor with the unlimited ability to 
designate beneficiaries. · 
While the magistrate court never explicitly ruled that there was a valid residuary clause, 
the court did st.ate at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment that "I've reviewed the 
residual clause. I think it's explicit and cleaI that he wanted Judd to dispose of anything that was 
left that wasn't disposed of." From this statement, it appears that the magistrate court believed 
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clause. For several reasons, this interpretation completely disregards the intent of the testator as 
expressed _in the will. 
First, the plain language in the will states that Judd Lanham is to be the executor of the 
estate-not the residual beneficiary. The Testator is adamant about this designation as he 
references it and restates it at other points in the will. From these phrases. it is clear that the 
intent of the testator was to establish Judd Lanham as Personal Representative-not to give him 
all of his property. Second, the testator clearly expresses his intent to give certain real property 
to two separate individuals. If such property falls into a residuary of one person, this clear intent 
would be frustrated. Third. the language in the will directs Judd to "distribute .. and "disperse" of 
his property. This is the role of a Personal Representative-not a residual beneficiary. 
The rules of construction apply unless a contrary intention has been expressed in the will. 
Here, the will expresses the intent to pass the Big Creek property to two individuals, to designate 
Judd Lanham as Personal Representative, and to have Judd "distribute .. and disperse" of his 
property. Th.is intent cannot be frustrated in an attempt to pass all of the testatorts property 
through the will. Instead, property that is not effectively disposed of falls into the residue and 
passes by intestate succession. Therefore. the magistrate court emd in finding that the Testator's 
intent was sufficiently clear to allow administration of the estate. 
II. THE MAGISTRATE COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT moMAS E. 
LANHAM WAS ONLY TO RECEIVE ONE DOLLAR AND A BED. 
A. Thomas E. Lanham was not disinherited because the Testator did not express a 
direct intent to disinherit him. 
Most of the Idaho cases dealing with disinheritance relate to the pretennitted child statute 
found at Idaho Code section I 5w2-302. In relevant part, this statute raises a preswnption that a 
child that is IJ,Ot provided for in a wi11 shall receive an intestate share unless "it appears from the 
7 
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will that the omission was intentional" Idaho Code§ 15-2-302 (2014). The purpose ofthis 
statute is to "protect children against omission or oversight which not infrequently happens from 
sickness. old age. infinnities or other peculiar circumstances." See Halfmoon v. Moore, 77 Idaho 
247 ~ 252 (I 955). 
According to these pretennitted child cases, an heir may be disinherited in a will, but 
only where the Testator expresses the intention to omit to provide for the heir through "dire~t 
language or language from which an inference equally as strong may be drawn." In re Fell's 
Estate, 70 Idaho 399. 403 (1950). Such intent cannot be subject to guess, surmise, or conjecture. 
Id The Idaho Supreme Court has also stated that ''[i]t is axiomatic that one provision of a will 
cannot be construed such that another section is ¥iolated since that would be contrary to the 
cardinal rule that the Court m.ust give effect to the express intention of the testator where possible 
and lawful." In re Estate of Howard, 112 Idaho 306 (1987). 
fu this case, the Testator did not express the clear intent to disinherit Thomas E. Lanham 
because there is no direct disinheritance language and any inference is subject to guess, sUrnrise, 
or conjecture. The will states that the Testator is "going to leave $1 more dollar against whatever 
is legal to him and then he is going to be on lus ovm." Subsequently, the Testator gives a bed to 
Thomas E. Lanhalll by stating that ''the smaller one in the other bedroom belongs to my son, 
Tom." Interpreting the first clause to completely disinherit Thomas E. Lanham would violate the 
second clause giving Tom a bed. and therefore is not a proper construction of the testator's 
intent. Instead, the phrase ''against whatever is legal to him" indicates that the testator intended 
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B. Even if Thomas E. Lanham was disinherited in the will, he still receives an 
intestate share of property beeause it passes oetside the will.· 
The issue of whether an exclusionary clause in a will applies to intestate property is a 
matter of first impression for the Idaho Courts. Although uncommon, these so called ''negative 
wills" have been invalidated in a majority of jurisdictions across the United States. See, e.g., In 
re Estate of Stroble, 636 P.2d 236 (Kan. 1981); In re Estate of Steward> 304 A.2d 361 (N.H. 
1973); Kimley v. Whittaker, 306 A.2d 443 (NJ. 1973); In re Smith's Estate, 353 S.W.2d 721 
(Mo. 1962); In re Dunn's Estate. 260 P.2d 964 (Cal. App. 2d 1953); In re Estate of Baxter, 821 
P.2d 184 (Okla. App. 1992); Cookv. Estate of Seeman, 858 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1993). These 
courts refuse to apply an exclusionary clause to intestate propeny despite clear and unambiguous 
language in a will expressing an intent to disinherit an heir. See Seeman, 858 S.W.2d at 115. 
These "negative wills" are invalidated for several reasons. First, intestate property passes 
by law rather than according to the terms of the will. Seeman, 858 S.W.2d at 115. Thus, the 
intestate statutes control the distribution of the property-not the testator. Id Second, social 
policy disfavors disinheriting children. See Stewart v. Pattison, 8 Gill 46 (Md. 1849). Third, 
because testators often have different reasons for excluding children from a will, applying an 
exclusionary clause to intestate property may actually be inconsistent with a testator's intent 
See, e.g., Bray v. Bray, 269 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1971); Kinahan v. Malone (In re Estate of Fritze}, 
259 P. 992 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. ~927); Kurrie v. Ky. Trust Co. of Louisville, 194 S.W.2d 638 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1946). 
Despite clear and unambiguous language in a will, a disinheritance clause only affects an 
heir's ability to t~e under the will. Baxter, 827 P .2d at I 86. It cannot prevent heirs from ta.king 
under the statutory rules of inheritance. Id. Once a will does not effectively dispose of a 
testator's property, the will no longer controls as intestate property passes by the operation of 
9 
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law. See id "Thus, a testator cannot disinherit his heirs by words alone, but in order to do so, 
the property must be given to somebody else." Id at 187. 
Those st.ates that do recognize "negative wills" usually do so through the enactment of 
state legislation. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 190B. § 2-101 (LexisNexis 2014); Haw. Rev. 
St.ate§ 560:2-101 (2010); N.D. Cent. Code§ 30.1-04-01 (2010); S.D. Codified Law§ 29A-2-
10l (2012); W. Va. Code Ann.§ 42-1-2 (LexisNexis 2014). Idaho does not have legislation that 
recognizes ''negative wills." See Idaho Code§ 15-2-101 (Lex.isNexis 2014). Instead, Idaho's 
intestacy laws mandate that property from a failed devise first passes to the residue and then 
through intestate succession. without regard to what is contained in the will. See Idaho Code § 
15-2-101 (2014); Idaho Code§ 15-2-606 (2014). 
Recognition of ''negative wills" will also have an undesirable effect on wrongful death 
actions and other causes of action because only "heirs" are entitled to certain legal rights. See 
Nebehr v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609,612 (1987). For example. a child that is 
disinherited because he is provided for in a trust would subsequently be unable to maintain a 
wrongful.death action for his parents' death because he would not be considered an ''heir" under 
Idaho intestacy laws. See id. 
While Idaho may choose to recognize "negative wills," it should do so through the proper 
legislative process. At this point, an Idaho court's recognition of"negative wills" would 
override Idaho's int.estate legislation and create inconsistencies in other Idaho statutes. Like a 
majority of U.S. states} Idaho should follow the common law approach by invalidating "negative 
wills." Should the Idaho Legislature wish to change the common law ruJe, it may do so through 
appropriate legislation. 
In the current case, the Testator did not effectively dispose of his property through his 
10 
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will, and there is no residual clause. The Idaho Legislature has outlined the procedure to follow 
when this occurs and through it expressed its intent not to recognize ''negative wills." Therefore, 
by operation of Idaho law, Thomas E. Lanham should receive his share of intestate property 
regardless of whether the Testator disinherited him in his will. 
CONCLUSION 
Thomas E. Lanham respectfully requests that this court reverse the holdings of the 
magistrate court finding that the Testator's intent is sufficiently clear to allow administration of 
the estate and that Thomas E. Lanham does not receive more than $1.00 and bed; and thereby 
grant summary judgment in favor of the Appellant 
DATED this 26th day ofNovember, 2014. 
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CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL 
AS UNTIMELY FILED AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
MOTION FOR FEES AND 
COSTS ON APPEAL 
ORIGINAL 
COMES NOW, The Respondent, Personal Representative Judd 
Lanham, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, 
and RESPONDENT in the above-entitled appeal, by and through his attorneys 
THE LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN, and Moves this Honorable Court 
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to Order that this appeal be dismissed with prejudice because the Notice of 
Appeal was not physically filed with the court clerk within 42 days of entry of 
Judgment as required by I.R.C.P. 83(e). 
Respondent Judd Lanham also requests this Court to award him 
reimbursement for costs and attorneys' fees incurred in defending this 
appeal pursuant to I,C, 12-120, -121, -and -123. 
The record in this case shows the Judgment was filed June 25, 2014, 
as shown by the clerk's stamp. The time for filing a Notice of Appeal ran out 
August 6, 2014, by Respondent's calculation. The Notice of Appeal was filed 
August 13, 2014, seven (7) days late. 
This appeal ought to be dismissed as untimely. It was and is 
unreasonable and frivolous to prosecute an appeal when the notice of appeal 
is not timely filed. Respondent, as the prevailing party, requests an award 
fees and costs related to defending the appeal, with a memorandum of fees 
and costs to be submitted later. 
MEMORANDUM 
Appeals from magistrate's division to the district court are governed by 
I.R.C.P. 83 (in addition to other authority not pertinent to this Motion). Rule 
83(e) prescribes how an appeal is filed. Like I.A.R. 14(a) (which concerns 
appeals from the district court) I.R.C.P. 83(e) requires the notice of appeal 
to be filed within 42 days after entry of the judgment appealed from. The 
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The motion for reconsideration filed by appellant's counsel in 
magistrate's division does not meet any of the four descriptions in Rule 
84(e)(l) through (4). 
The first type, (1), is "a timely motion for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict following a timely motion for a directed verdict." There was no 
trial or verdict. The motion for reconsideration cannot be one of the type 
described in (1). 
The second type, (2), is "a timely motion to amend or make additional 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, whether or not alteration of the 
judgment is required if the motion is granted." The motion for 
reconsideration was filed before the magistrate entered any findings of fact 
or conclusions of law, and before the court entered judgment. The motion 
for reconsideration cannot be one of the type described in (2). 
The third type of motion, (3), is "a timely motion to alter or amend the 
judgment (except motions under Rule 60 or motions regarding costs and 
attorney fees)." Because no judgment was entered at the time Appellant 
filed the motion for reconsideration, that motion cannot be of the type 
described in (3). 
The fourth type of motion, (4), is "a timely motion for new trial." Since 
there was no trial, appellant's motion for reconsideration cannot be of the 
type described in (4). 
Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, Case No. CV-2013-886 
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One thing all four types of motions listed in Rule 83(e)(l) through (4) 
have in common is that they all are motions filed after entry of judgment. 
(Respondent recognizes that a motion notwithstanding the verdict may well 
be filed after the verdict and before entry of judgment, but in such a case 
the time for appeal would not have begun; therefore, there would be no 
need for Rule 83(e) to have any bearing on that case. All four types of 
motions, 83(e)(l) through (4), are post-judgment motions. 
To interpret Rule 83 in a manner which includes Appellant's motion for 
reconsideration would lead to an absurd result: not only would Appellant's 
notice of appeal filed 49 days after judgment be timely, but also the 42 day 
time for filing an appeal in this case would not even have started running. 
A timely filing of the motions described in (1) through (4) of I.R.C.P. 83(3), 
not only suspends running of time for appeal, it restarts the 42 day period 
running when the motion is denied. Since Appellant never sought a hearing, 
there has been lHI. explicit decision on that motion, so the time for appeal 
has not even started running. Respondent respectfully submits that result 
would be absurd. 
Respondent submits that a better way to view the June 20 motion for 
reconsideration is as a vehicle for Mr. Fleenor to make sure he made all the 
arguments and cited all the authority he intended to at the June 10, 2014 
hearing. (The motion added nothing to what had been argued before.) By 
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that view, the motion for reconsideration was denied by entry of the 
judgment and the findings of fact and conclusions of law June 25, 2014. 
Thus viewed, the motion for reconsideration can have no effect on the 
time for appeal and this appeal ought to be dismissed as untimely. 
Even so, Appellant may argue that the motion was one of the category 
(2) type because-even though no findings of fact or conclusions of law had 
been entered-the motion was filed in response to the magistrate's 
comments at the June 10, 2014 hearing on the motion and the cross-motion 
for summary judgment. The motion for reconsideration was filed June 20th, 
2014, ten days after the hearing on summary judgment. 
Rather than seeking amendments or additions to findings of fact or 
conclusions of law-which at that time did not yet exist-the relief Appellant 
requested in the June 20, 2014 motion is for the magistrate "to reconsider 
its ruling on his motion for summary judgment" (opening paragraph of 
motion) and "to reconsider its opinion that the Will disposes of all of 
Testator's property, and that parole evidence can be used to ascertain the 
Testator's intent in disposing of his property" (final paragraph). 
At the June 10, 2014 hearing the magistrate did announce he was 
denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment and granting 
Respondent's cross-motion. His Honor advised that in that court's view, the 
will at issue was clear, Decedent Lanham's intent was clear, Decedent 
disposed of his property, Decedent clearly disinherited his two boys (which 
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includes Appellant), and the court is "not going to override his [Decedent's] 
wishes." (Tr. June 10, 2014 hearing, pp. 113-14.) 
The court's comments made while announcing his decision at the 
conclusion of the summary judgment hearing, cannot reasonably be viewed 
as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which the Court later 
entered with the judgment on June 25, 2014. Neither can Appellant's 
motion for reconsideration filed June 20, 2014 be rationally considered a 
"motion to amend or make additional findings of fact or conclusions of law," 
as defined in I.R.C.P. 83(e)(2). 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Respondent requests this Court to award him reimbursement for costs 
and attorneys' fees incurred in defending this appeal pursuant to I.C. 12-
120, -121, -and -123. If this Court grants this motion to dismiss appeal, 
then Respondent will be the prevailing party. 
Failure to file a notice of appeal on time is jurisdictional. I.R.C.P. 
83(e)(s). "The failure to physically file a notice of appeal or notice of cross-
appeal with the district court within the time limits prescribed by these rules 
shall be jurisdictional." Prosecuting an appeal when the notice of appeal has 
not been filed in time seems to Respondent to be "frivolous conduct," as 
defined by I.C. §18-12-123(1)(b). If Appellant raises the defense to 
untimeliness anticipated in this Respondent's motion to dismiss appeal, 
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(based on the prejudgment filing of motion for reconsideration) Respondent 
submits, that argument is also frivolous. 
SUMMARY 
Because no post-judgment motion such as described in Rule 83(e)(l) 
through (4) was filed; and because Appellant filed his notice of appeal 49 
days after judgment was entered and filed, the appeal was untimely. It 
would seem to Respondent beyond argument that prosecuting an appeal 
when the notice of appeal was not timely filed is unreasonable and frivolous 
and that Respondent ought to be reimbursed for fees and costs incurred to 
date in defending the judgment in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal should be dismissed with prejudice and Appellant should 
be awarded his fees and costs expended to date in defending the appeal and 
Respondent respectfully so prays this Honorable Court. 
Dated this 13th day of January, 2015. 
~?c By Rolf Kehne 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Case No. CV-2013-886 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL 
COMES NOW the Appellant. by and through his attorney of record, Patrick J. Geile of 
Foley Freeman, PLLC, and hereby responds to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal pursuant 
to Rule 83(t) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
:MEMORANDUM 
Respondent's motion to Dismiss should be denied because Appe~l.ant made a timely 
lksponse to Motion to Dismiss Appeal ~ l 
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motion to alter the judgment of the magistrate court. I.R.C.P. 83(e) governs the time frame for 
filing an appeal to a district court from the magistrate division. It states that an appeal must be 
filed within 42 days of a judgment and that ''the running of the time for appeal from a final 
judgment is suspended by ... (2) a timely motion to amend or make additional findings of fact or 
conclusions of law, whether or not alteration of the judgment is required if the motion is 
granted." 
A motion for reconsideration tolls the running of the time for an appeal. State v. 
Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 144 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1994). In Ade, the appellate court held that 1'[a] Rule 59 motion to amend the judgment or a Rule 
1 l(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration. if timely made, would toll the time to file a notice of 
appeal." Ade, 126 Idaho at 116. There, the court held that a motion filed seventeen days post-
judgment was untimely, arid noted that a motion for reconsideration must ''be made not later 
than fourteen days after the entry of final judgment." Id. ( emphasis added). Again in Ferguson, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "[i]n the civil arena, this Court has held that a motion 
under I.R.C.P 59 to alter or amend the judgment or a motion under I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) for 
reconsideration tolls the time period for the filing of a notice of appeal." Ferguson, 13 8 Idaho at 
661. In that case, the court found that a motion for reconsideration, which was filed fourteen 
days after the court entered its order, tolled the appeals period. Id 
Both of those cases dealt with appeals from the district court under Idaho Appellate Rule 
14{a). However.as Respondent points out in his Memorandum, I.R.C.P. 83(e) and Idaho 
Appellate Rule 14(a) contain similar provisions and identical timeframes for filing a notice of 
appeal. Ferguson and Ade should apply to I.RC.P. 83(e) as well. 
I.R.C.P. l(a) provides that the rules of civil procedure "shall be liberally construed to 
Response to Motion to Dismiss Appeal - 2 
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secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Motions 
for reconsideration are govemed by I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B). The rule states that "[a] motion for 
reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed 
within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order." Akin to a memorandum of costs filed 
under Rule 54(d)(5), a premature motion for reconsideration is nonetheless timely. See I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(5}. 
In this c~e. Appellant made a timely motion to alter the judgment of the magistrate 
court. At a hearing on summary judgment on June 10, 2014, the magistrate court ordered from 
that bench that it was "going to grant summary judgment on behalf of the personal 
representative" and deny Appellant's motion for summary judgment. In response, Appellant 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 20, 2014. Two docun1ents entitled "Judgment" and. 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
were later filed on June 25, 2014. The notice of appeal was filed forty-nine days later on August 
13, 2014. While typically a motion for reconsideration is filed after the filing of a judgment, the 
court's ruling from the bench precipitated the filing of the motion to reconsider on June 20th, 
which was within 14 days of the June 10th hearing. 
The magistrate court never made a ruling on the motion to reconsider. Respondent 
attempts to circumvent this fact by stating that it was denied by the entry of Judgment. This 
position is untenable for two reasons. First, neither the Judgment nor the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law make any reference to the Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, both 
documents state that the ''Court considered the filings, affidavits and Memoranda submitted 
before the hearing, and considered oral arguments of counsel made at the hearing." Second, a 
court may either grant or deny a motion with or without a hearing. The magistrate court's failure 
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to rule on the motion here has created the odd conundrum where the appeals period has been 
tolled indefinitely. 
The requirements for tolling the appeals period under I.R.C.P. 83(e) have been met in this 
case. Although Appellant's Motion to Reconsider was potentially premature, it was nonetheless 
timely made because it was not made later than fourteen days after the entry of the judgment. 
Therefore, the time period for filing an appeal was tolled by the· Appellant's :motion for 
reconsideration, and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Ap~llant respectfully requests that this court deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
and award Appellant his fees and costs associated with defending this motion. 
DATED this 16'h day of January, 2015. 
/ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, ) 
Deceased. ) 
) _____________ ) 
) 




JUDD LANHAM, ) 
Personal Representative ) 
Respondent. ) _________ ) 
CASE NO. CV2013-886 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY RE: 
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL 
COMES NOW, The Respondent, Judd Lanham, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, by and 
through his attorneys THE LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN, and 
submits this reply to Appellant's "Response to Motion to Dismiss Appeal." 
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Respondent Judd Lanham moved this Court to dismiss this appeal 
because Appellant Thomas Everett Lanham did not file a notice of appeal 
within 42 days of entry of judgment, as required by I.R.C.P. 83(e). 
Appellant, in his response to the motion to dismiss appeal, asserts, "A 
motion for reconsideration tolls the running of the time for appeal. State v. 
Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659 (Ct. App. 2002); and Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114 
(Ct. App. 1994)." Neither of those two cases supports that statement of law 
as written by Appellant. Appellant's statement is way too broad. 
State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 67 P.3d 1271 (Ct. App. 2002), 
seems to be an odd choice of authority for Appellant to cite supposedly to 
show appellant's notice of appeal in this case was timely filed. 
Ferguson involved the scope of appellate review of a restitution order 
entered in a criminal case. In that case the State did not question the 
timeliness of Mr. Ferguson's appeal. Instead, the State argued that 
appellate review was limited to those issues actually raised in a motion to 
reconsider, rather than all the issues Mr. Ferguson raised in the hearing 
resulting in the restitution order. 
Jerry Ferguson was sentenced to prison for a felony. The court 
retained jurisdiction. At a hearing following the period of retained 
jurisdiction, the court suspended the prison sentence and placed Mr. 
Ferguson on probation. In the terms and order of probation Mr. Ferguson 
was required to pay restitution. The amount of restitution was "TBD" (to be 
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determined). Much later, almost two years after Mr. Ferguson was 
discharged from probation, the victim in the case, who was also Mr. 
Ferguson's ex-wife, sought a judgment, writ of execution and an order for 
continuing garnishment, attaching a statement of costs and an affidavit, but 
not an order of restitution (because none had ever been entered). The 
district court granted Mr. Ferguson's motion to quash the writ of execution 
and the order for garnishment because no order had been entered which 
required Mr. Ferguson to pay money to his ex-wife as restitution. 
Ferguson's ex-wife then applied for an order of restitution. At the 
hearing Ferguson challenged the court's jurisdiction to enter an order for 
restitution, arguing the court lost jurisdiction to do so when the court 
discharged Mr. Ferguson from probation. The court entered a restitution 
order requiring Mr. Ferguson to pay $21,114.84 plus interest as restitution. 
Ferguson timely filed his motion for reconsideration, addressed solely 
to the amount of restitution ordered. The district court granted Ferguson's 
motion in part, reducing the amount to $19,539.84 plus interest. Ferguson 
filed his appeal within 42 days of entry of the reduced restitution order 
entered in response to the motion for reconsideration. 
The state claimed that appellate review was limited to the amount of 
the restitution, because while the notice of appeal was filed within 42 days of 
the amended restitution order, more than 42 days had elapsed between the 
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issuance of the first restitution order and the notice of appeal. The Court of 
Appeals rejected the State's argument. 
First, the State contends that this Court has no jurisdiction 
to consider matters not raised in Jerry's motion for 
reconsideration because Ferguson's notice of appeal was timely 
only from the amended order of restitution. The State argues 
that when an appeal is timely only from an amended order, the 
only issues preserved are those relating to the amendment. The 
State asserts that because Jerry only challenged the amount of 
restitution in his motion for reconsideration, this Court now lacks 
jurisdiction to hear Jerry's challenges to his obligation to pay 
restitution and may only consider his claims that the amount of 
restitution ordered is improper. 
Relief from a restitution order cannot be pursued by a 
motion to reduce or correct a sentence pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35; rather, a defendant may seek relief pursuant 
to LC. § 19-5304(10). State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 544, 768 
P.2d 804, 807 {Ct. App.1989). Under I.C. § 19-5304(10), "a 
defendant, against whom a restitution order has been entered, 
may, within forty-two {42) days of the entry of the order of 
restitution, request relief from the restitution order in accordance 
with the Idaho rules of civil procedure relating to relief from final 
orders." In the civil arena, this Court has held that a motion 
under I.R.C.P. 59 to alter or amend the judgment or a motion 
under I.R.C.P. ll{a){2){B) for reconsideration tolls the time 
period for the filing of a notice of appeal as provided in I.A.R. 
14{a). J.P. Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. City of Wallace, 
129 Idaho 542, 546, 928 P.2d 46, so {Ct.App. 1996); Ade v. 
Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 116, 878 P.2d 813, 815 {Ct.App.1994). 
In the instant case, fourteen days after the court entered the 
order of restitution, Jerry filed a motion for reconsideration. In 
his motion, Jerry challenged the court's finding as to the amount 
of restitution he owed to Julie. The motion for reconsideration, 
therefore, could affect the order of restitution, thus tolling the 
appeal period. Upon entry of the amended order of restitution 
the appeal period began once again and Jerry timely filed his 
notice of appeal. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to 
consider Jerry's appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 14{a). 
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The other case cited by appellant, Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 878 
P.3d 813 (Ct. App. 1994) is similarly unhelpful to Appellant. In that case, 
after summary judgment was entered against appellant Batten, the 
appellant filed a "motion for new trial." That motion was inaccurately named 
because there had been no trial. Our Court of Appeals would have been 
willing to construe the motion according to its true nature, a motion to 
amend judgment under I.R.C.P. 59. Because Batten's post-judgment motion 
was not filed within 14 days, as required by the rule, his notice of appeal 
was untimely even though the notice was filed within 42 days of the denial 
of the post-judgment motion. 
In this case, there was no post-judgment motion. Appellant attempts 
to get around this by arguing that Appellant's motion for reconsider, which 
was filed after the hearing on summary judgment but before entry of both 
the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, was really a 
post-judgment motion that was filed prematurely, and therefore timely, 
citing I.R.C.P. 54(d)(S) as the only authority. That provision expressly 
allows litigants to file and serve a memorandum of costs after the decision of 
a jury or the court but in no event later than 14 days after entry of 
judgment. That provision has absolutely nothing to do with post-judgment 
motions or with the issues presented by the motion to dismiss the appeal in 
this case. 
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Appellant concedes that his argument, if accepted by this court, would 
mean the 42 day time for appeal in this case has not even begun to run. 
Appellant described this as "an odd conundrum." (Appellant's Response to 
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 3-4.) In his Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Respondent 
described the situation as "an absurd result: not only would Appellant's 
notice of appeal filed 49 days after judgment be timely, but also the 42 day 
time for filing an appeal in this case would not even have started running." 
(Motion to Dismiss Appeal, p. 5) 
Respondent submits that when an interpretation of the Idaho Court 
Rules leads to "an odd conundrum" and "an absurd result," that 
interpretation is incorrect. Respondent submits that under a correct 
interpretation of the rules, Appellant's motion for reconsideration, filed 
before entry of judgment and entry of findings and conclusions, and 
requesting "the Court to reconsider its ruling on his Motion for Summary 
Judgment" (Motion, first paragraph) and to "reconsider its opinion that the 
Will disposes of all of Testator1s property, and that parole evidence can be 
used to ascertain the Testator1s intent in disposing of his property" (Motion, 
final paragraph) is a nullity. The motion for reconsideration had no effect on 
the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
In addition to the unsupportable argument that the prejudgment 
motion for reconsideration was really a timely, albeit prematurely, filed post-
judgment motion to amend or make additional findings of fact; Appellant 
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argues that the time for appeal "has been tolled indefinitely" because the 
magistrate never expressly decided that motion. 
Appellant seems to argue it is Magistrate Judge Tyler Smith's fault that 
the time for appeal "has been tolled indefinitely" because His Honor never 
explicitly denied the motion Again, this argument is off base. It is the 
litigant's duty to secure a hearing on a motion if one is desired. I.R.C.P. 
7(b). Nowhere in the motion for reconsideration did Appellant indicate 
"hearing requested" or "argument requested." No notice of hearing 
accompanied the motion. There is no hint in the record that Appellate tried 
to set a hearing or that the court or the court clerk denied a hearing or 
argument. 
Surely, if Appellant desired a hearing or decision on the motion, he 
would have taken some step to get one, especially after the court entered 
findings and conclusions and judgment. 
Appellant's motion for reconsideration added no authority or argument 
to what Appellant already provided. Under the circumstances, Respondent 
reiterates the position advocated in his motion to dismiss appeal at pp. 5-6: 
Respondent submits that a better way to view the June 20 
motion for reconsideration is as a vehicle for Mr. Fleenor to make 
sure he made all the arguments and cited all the authority he 
intended to at the June 10, 2014 hearing. (The motion added 
nothing to what had been argued before.) By that view, the 
motion for reconsideration was denied by entry of the judgment 
and the findings of fact and conclusions of law June 25, 2014. 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
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In his motion to dismiss appeal, Respondent requested this Court to 
award him reimbursement for costs and attorneys' fees incurred in 
defending this appeal pursuant to LC. §§ 12-120, -121, -and -123. 
Respondent represents to the Court that his counsel contacted opposing 
counsel by telephone and notified them of the timeliness issue and that 
Respondent would be filing a motion to dismiss. Counsel telephoned 
opposing counsel again after the motion to dismiss was filed and served 
upon them. In both telephone conversations, Appellant's counsel declined to 
stipulate to dismissal. Respondent submits that Appellant's arguments 
against dismissal are wholly without basis in fact or law and are frivolous as 
defined by LC. §18-12-123(1)(b) and fees and costs should be awarded to 
Appellant for litigating this issue, in addition to the other fees and costs 
incurred or expended in defending the appeal to date. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Because no post-judgment motion such as described in Rule 83(e)(1) 
through (4) or any other type of post-judgment motion was timely filed; and 
because Appellant filed his notice of appeal 49 days after judgment was 
entered and filed, the appeal was untimely. This appeal should be dismissed 
with prejudice and Appellant should be awarded his fees and costs expended 
to date in defending the appeal and Respondent respectfully so prays this 
Honorable Court. 
Dated this __ day of January, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify service of the forgoing motion and memorandum on 
~ 
opposing counsel by facsimile sent this ~aay of January, 2015 to: 
Patrick J. Geile 
Matthew G. Ben nett 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC, 
FAX: (208) 888-5130 
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Case No. CV-2013-886 
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 
This matter is before the court on the motion of the personal representative of the estate, 
to dismiss the appeal of Thomas Everett Lanham for lack of jurisdiction, upon the grounds that 
the appeal was untimely filed. For reasons stated, the motion is granted 
Factual and Procedural History 
Alleging himself to be an heir of the decedent, Thomas Everett Lanham petitioned the 
court below to challenge the efficacy of the will of the decedent admitted to probate and the 
authority of the personal representative to act under it. The personal representative contested the 
petition, and in due course, crossing motions for summary judgment were filed and argued. The 
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magistrate granted the motion of the personal representative, dismissing the intervenor's petition 
in its entirety and sustaining the continued probate of will. This appeal followed. 
The chronology of events is critical: 
On June 10, 2014, after the hearing on the crossing motions for summary judgment, the 
magistrate below announced from the bench that he intended to grant the personal 
representative's motion summary judgment. 
On June 20, 2014, the intervenor below filed a motion for reconsideration, apparently 
against the oral comments of the court. 
On June 25, 2014, the magistrate filed a written decision and order on summary judgment 
that included detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a final order in the case 
dismissing the intervenor's petition and ruling that the probate of will would continue. The 
Judgment was filed this date. 
On August 13, 2014, the intervenor filed a notice of appeal from the written decision and 
order of the magistrate. This filing was 49 days after the filing of the written decision. 
The personal representative now moves to dismiss the appeal upon the grounds that it 
was not timely filed as required by law. 
Analysis 
Under IRCP 83(e) an appeal from a final order of the magistrate's court must be filed 
within 42 days from entry of the order. The time is jurisdictional and cannot be extended; the 
notice of appeal must be physically in the hands of the clerk of the court before midnight on the 
last day. In this case, the notice of appeal was not filed until 49 days after the entry of the 
decision on summary judgment, being the final order of the magistrate. Unless tolled by 
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operation of law as explained below, the filing of the appeal was untimely, and the appeal must 
be dismissed. 
The Appellant argues that because he filed a motion for reconsideration on June 20, 2014, 
the deadline for filing an appeal in this matter was extended until 42 days after the court's ruling 
on reconsideration. He argues that since the motion for reconsideration was never heard, the time 
for appeal continues to be extended into the future. The argument is misplaced and unpersuasive. 
It is accurate that a motion for reconsideration properly filed under IRCP l l(a)(2)(B) 
may extend the deadline for an appeal until 42 days after the court's ruling on reconsideration, at 
least to the extent of issues raised in the motion for reconsideration. However, the motion for 
reconsideration must be filed after the entry of the order to be reconsidered. In this case, the 
reconsideration was filed before the written order was entered, apparently upon the verbal 
statements made from the bench. The verbal statements are completely subsumed and mooted by 
the written order, so the motion for reconsideration of the verbal order became a nullity. The 
motion could not operate as a reconsideration of the written order, for by definition, 
reconsideration cannot lie before the happening of the action to be reconsidered, To press the 
issue, it was incumbent upon petitioner to refile his motion, or file it anew, against the written 
order. This was not done. 
Here, there was no motion for reconsideration after the entry of the written order, nor any 
other recognized post judgment motion provided under the rules. The appeal clock was started 
on June 25, 2014, the day the written order was entered. When no motion against the written 
final order nor any notice of appeal was filed, the jurisdiction of this court to consider an appeal 
from the written order on summary judgment ended 42 days later, on August 6, 2014. The notice 
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of appeal came on August 13, 2014, nine days later, by which time this court had lost all 
jurisdiction to consider the matter on appeal. 
Conclusion 
Unless an allowed post judgment motion is filed against the order or judgment being 
appealed from, IRCP 83(e) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 42 days after the entry 
of the judgment or order. The notice of appeal in this case was not filed within 42 days of the 
entry of the magistrate's final order, nor was any motion against such order as is cognizable 
under the civil rules filed. Therefore, the personal representative's motion to dismiss the appeal 
is GRANTED. 
Dated this l.Q_\ay of February 2015. 
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on ~ay of February, 2015, s/he served a true and correct 
copy of the original of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL on the following individuals in the manner described: 
• upon counsel for appellant: 
Patrick J. Geile 
Matthew G. Bennett 
953 S. Industry Way 
P.O. Box 10 
Meridian, ID 83680 
• upon counsel for defendant: 
Nancy L. Callahan 
Rolf M. Kehne 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
and/or when s/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL in the U.S. Mail with sufficient postage to 
individuals at the addresses listed above. 
Clerk of the Court 
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The Personal Representative, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 
and 41, and respectfully claims and submits the following as a true and 
accurate accounting of the costs and fees incurred with respect to Appellant's 
untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal and filing of Appellant's Brief on 
Appeal. 
The personal representative incurred $132.00 costs. 
Nancy L. Callahan and Rolf Kehne, based upon the time records of 
counsel per the Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees filed herein and in 
consideration of the usual and customary fees in similar types of cases the 
Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham incurred $23,957.50 in attorney's fees for 
total attorney's fees and costs of $24,089.50. 
ORIG\NAL 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Gem ) 
Nancy L. Callahan, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
That I am one of the attorneys for the Personal Representative in the 
above-entitled action, and as such I am familiar with the attorney's fees 
incurred by the Personal Representative on behalf of the estate of Gordon 
Thomas Lanham, subject of this action; and I have reviewed the foregoing 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees and to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
the items contained therein are correct and have been actually and 
necessarily incurred by Respondent in the course of preparing to respond to 
Appellant's Brief on an untimely filed Notice of Appeal and preparing 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Untimely Filed, Reply and Second 
Motion for Extension of Time, and are claimed and are submitted in 
compliance with Idaho Appellant Rules 40 and 41. 
2015. 
DATED ~ay of February 2015. 
or Personal Representative 
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NOTARPUBLIC for Idaho 
Residing at Et,..\~ , Idaho 
My commission expires: o(za, 1'20\b 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. ,t-, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the _/d[_ day of February 2015, I caused 
to be personally delivered, a true and accurate copy of this MEMORANDUM 
OF COSTS AND FEES to Appellant's attorneys of record via facsimile to the 
number below. 
Patrick J. Geile 
Matthew G Bennett 
FOLEY FREEMAN 
Facsimile: (208) 888-5130 
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Patrick J. Gelle, ISB No. 697S 
Matthew G. Bennett, ISB No. 9499 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC 
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P.O.Box 10 
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Case No. CV-2013-88' 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM 
or COSTS AND A'JTORNEY'S FEES 
COMES NOW the Appellant; by and through his attomey of record. Patrick J. Oeile of 
Foley Freeman. PLLC, and hereby objects to Respondent's Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney's Fees based on the following: 
l. Respondent cites Idaho Appellate Rule 41 as authority for an .award of attorney's 
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fees in this case. Th.is rule, however. is inapplicable to the cUITent proceeding because fees under 
this rule can only be awarded where the party seeking fees demands them in his first appellate 
brief. Here, no appellate brief has been filed, so I.A.R. 41 simply does not apply. 
2. The more appropriate rules are found in Rule 83 ofl}ie Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure dealing with appeals from decisions of magistrates. In particular, Rule 83(x) states 
that appellate procedure not covered by Rule 83 ''shall be in accordance with the appropriate rule 
of the I.R.C.P. or the I.A.R." Because Rule 83 does not address attorney's fees, we must look to 
these other rules for guidance. 
3. As explained above, I.A.R. 41 does not apply because no attorney's fees were 
sought in an appellate brief Thus, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) and l.R.C.P. 54(e)(I) seem to be the most 
appropriate rules regarding attorney's fees. In particular, Rule 54(e)(l) allows for the award of 
attorney's fees "when provided for by any statute or contract." 
4. Idaho code section 12~121 appears to be the only statutory authority for an award 
of attorney's fees in this case. l.R.C.P. 54(e)(I) restricts awards under section 12-121 to 
situations where a court finds that a case "was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation.'' This is simply not the case here. 
5. As the court points out in its Order Dismissing Appeal, .. a motion for 
reconsideration properly filed under IRCP l l(a)(2)(B) may extend the deadline for an appeal 
until 42 days after the cou11·s ruling on reconsideration." However, it found that such a motion 
''must be filed after the entry of the order to be reconsidered." This was a novel issue that had 
not previously been addressed by the Idaho courts, and Appellant's argument that a premature 
motion should nonetheless be considered timely was ~ot frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation. As such, Respondent should not be awarded attorney's fees. 
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6. Idaho cases dealing with dismissal of an appeals due to an tmtimely filing. are 
consistent with this analysis. Herrett v. Herrett, 105 Idaho 358. 361 (1983) C'Parties to bear 
their own costs on appeal."); Laurance v. Laurance, 112 Idaho 635, 637 (1987) ("No attorney 
fees on appeal."); In re Estate of Bower. 119 Idaho 922,922 (1991) ("No costs or attorney fees 
awarded on appeal."); Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185, 191 (2005)(Court awarded 
attorney's fees tmder Idaho Code section 12-121 where "the appeal was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably. or without foundation''). 
7. Even .if Respondent was entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code 
section 12-121, the claimed amount of$23,957.50 is clearly exorbitant. To date, Respondent has 
only filed two motions for an extension of time, a motion to dismiss the appeal, and a Reply Re: 
Dismissal of Appeal. No appellate'briefhas been filed. In fact, by reference to Exhibit A of 
Respondent·s Affidavit for Attorney's Fees and Costs it becomes evident that Respondent's 
counsel hasn't even begun to 'Wl'ite its brief, but has conducted days and days of"research." By 
contrast, Appellant's counsel has conducted research, written an appellate brief, and responded 
to Respondent's motions at half the cost. To date, Appellant's counsel has only provided 
approximately $10,362.50 in services. 
8. Idaho Appellate Rule 40 does allow a court to award costs to the prevailing party 
regardless of whether an appellate brief has been filed requesting them. However, Appellant 
asserts that the costs claimed by the Respondent were unwarranted and wasteful. When 
Appellant filed bis appellate brief, cotmSel for AppeJlant sent Respondent's counsel a signed 
copy of said brief. This brief was only 16 pages long. Appellant has also provided cotmSel for 
Respondent with all other pleadings associated with this case. It is not apparent where the 
alleged cost for 22 pages came from. but regardless these costs should not be paid by Appellant 
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as they were completely urmecessary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that each party bear his O'Wn 
attorney's fees and costs associated with this appeal. 
DATED this l'.)h day of February, 2015: 
MAN,PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the rJ" day of February. 2015, I, caused to be served a true · 
and correct copy of the foregoing docwnent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Nancy L. Callahan 
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
Personal Representative 
William F. Lee 
3421 Butte Road 
Emmett, ID 83617 
Attorney for Keith Colby Lanham 
Kathy Oilliham 
I 004 I De Witt 
Boise, ID 83704 
Judd Max Lanham 
1504 N. McKirmey 
Boise, ID 83704 
Mailed 
..X Faxed: (208) 365-1646 
Hand Delivered 
Mailed 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 0 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 










CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
This action is an informal probate of the estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham. Gordon 
Thomas Lanham died on December 5, 2013. The original Will was filed with the Court on 
December 20, 2013 and Judd Lanham was informally appointed personal representative. 
Thomas Everett Lanham, a son of deceden~ filed a pro se pleading titled "Application to 
Attest Personal Representative" that included claims that the Will was not valid and that the 
personal representative was not qualified on January 8, 2014 and Keith Lanham, a son of 
decedent, by and through his attorney William F. Lee, filed a Petition to Remove Personal 
Representative with claims contesting the validity of the Will on January 13, 2014. The 
matters were set for hearing on January 21, 2014. 
On January 21, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, pro se, and Keith Lanham with his 
attorney, William F. Lee, were present in Court. Judd Lanham was present with counsel. 
Also present were the two witnesses to the decedent's will, Rebecca Clift. notary, Cathy 
Gillihan, sister of the decedent, and other family members. This Court advised the parties 
that two matters were before the Court; the issue of removal of the personal representative 
and the validity of the will. The Court declined to remove the personal representative and 
set a court trial concerning the construction of the will for April 2, 2014. 
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On March 24, 2014 Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in this case on behalf of 
Thomas Everett Lanham. He filed a Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, 
Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a Petition of Order Restraining Personal 
Representative. He set a hearing for the motions for April 3, 2014 at 11 :00. 
On March 28, 2014 the personal representative, Judd Lanham, filed an affidavit and 
distributed a copy of an audio recording decedent made concerning his will and the 
distribution of his property.. On March 28, 2014, William F. Lee, on behalf of Keith 
Lanham, withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal Representative and his claim contesting 
the validity of the will. 
On April 2, 2014, the personal representative and various witnesses appeared 
prepared for trial. Thomas Everett Lanham and his attorney Mr. Fleenor failed to appear for 
the court trial to construe or determine the validity of the will. 
On April 3, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham appeared with his counsel, Mr. Fleenor, for 
hearing on the Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will and 
Determining Heirs and the Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative. The 
Court reviewed the record, pleadings and considered arguments of counsel and denied the 
petitions and awarded the estate attorney's fees, to be determined. The personal 
representative filed a motion and affidavit for fees and an objection was filed by Mr. 
Fleenor. That award of attorney's fees has been pending and considered in this 
memorandum. 
On April 23, 2014 Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham again claiming that the will was not valid for various 
reasons and claimed the residue of the estate should pass intestate to decedent's heirs. The 
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summary judgment motion did not include any supporting affidavits or evidence. The 
estate responded as required under I.R.C.P. 56(e) and filed a motion for summary judgment 
and motion to dismiss supported by affidavits of the personal representative, decedent's 
sister, and decedent's son Keith Lanham. Thomas Everett Lanham did not file any 
affidavits or other evidence in response to the estate's motion for summary judgment as 
contemplated by I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
On June 10, 2014, the Court heard oral arguments on the parties' motions for 
summary judgment and denied Thomas Everrett Lanham' s motion and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the estate. On June 20, 2014, Mr. Fleenor filed a motion for 
reconsideration. That matter was never noticed for hearing. 
On June 24, 2014, entered :findings of fact and conclusions of law having no reason 
to doubt the validity of the will and that the decedent's intent was sufficiently clear from the 
language of the will, particularly as bolstered and explained by contemporary audio 
recordings and the affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, if necessary, judicial 
enforcement. As to the claimant, Thomas Everett Lanham, decedent's intent was clear that 
claimant take by the will only one dollar ($1.00) and a bed and there was no reason to 
frustrate decedent's intent. From the affidavits and the audio recordings, decedent Gordon 
Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the time of he executed the 
will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the extent and nature of his assets. He also 
demonstrated a good grasp of his potential heirs, and his relationships with them and sound 
reasons for treating each as he did. There was no evidence suggesting that anyone exercised 
undue influence or coercion over decedent in spite of his failing health. Based upon the 
language of the will itself, the affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire record, the 
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Court found in favor of the Personal Representative on every factual dispute. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. The estate was the prevailing party pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(b ). 
The estate presented a Motion for Attorney's fees and Costs pursuant to Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure 54(d), Idaho Code §12-121 and §12-123. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there 
were multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or other 
multiple of cross issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party 
prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion 
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in 
part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties 
in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Idaho Code § 12-121, states in relevant part: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal, or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. 
Idaho §12-123(2)(a) states: 
In accordance with the provisions of this section, a any time prior to the 
commencement of the trial in a civil action or within twenty one (21) days 
after the entry of judgment in a civil action, the court may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely affected by 
frivolous conduct. 
Idaho Code §12-123 (l)(b) defines "frivolous conduct" of a party means conduct 
of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that is not supported in fact or 
warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
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Thus, in determining whether to award attorney's fees in this case, the Court must 
resolve two issues: (1) whether the estate was the prevailing party and (2) whether the 
non-prevailing party acted frivolously and without basis in fact or law. Rammel v State, 
154 Idaho 669, (2003 ). 
The estate was the prevailing party on April 2, 2014, the time set for trial on the 
issue of construing the will. Thomas Lanham Jr. and his attorney failed to appear for the 
Yz day court trial scheduled on April 2, 2014. The failure to appear was not excused for 
good cause or excusable neglect. At the hearing on April 3, 2014, the Court reviewed the 
file and Thomas Lanham Jr.'s pending petitions. The Court had previously considered 
the issue of removal of the personal representative in January 2014. Although Thomas 
Lanham, Jr. made several claims and allegations, he failed to support those claims with 
any admissible evidence necessary to sustain his burden of proof. The Petition for Order 
Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and Petition 
for Order Restraining Personal Representative were made without foundation. 
The estate was the prevailing party on summary judgment. Thomas Lanham, Jr. 
filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum. The estate filed 
responsive affidavits to the motion by the personal representative, the decedent's sister, 
and decedent's son, (also disinherited by decedent) and in support of the estate's motion 
for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. Thomas Lanham, Jr. filed no response to 
the estate's motion, as required by LR.C.P. (56)(e): 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of that party's pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. 
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Based upon Thomas Lanham, Jr.'s failure to appear on April 2, 2014, and his 
failure to present any evidence supporting his claims or in opposition of the motion made 
by the estate, the Court finds that his prosecution of his claims against the estate were 
frivolous and without foundation. 
The Court is also authorized to award attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 15-
§8-208. This statute authorizes the court in its discretion to order costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees be awarded to any party in proceedings involving decedent's 
estates. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
The Court must next determine the appropriate amount for such awards. The 
estate has not made a claim for costs. Once the Court makes a determination that 
attorney fees should be awarded, it must determine a "reasonable" amount of attorney's 
fees. Some of the factors to be determined pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) are: 
(A) The time and labor required 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability 
of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstance of the case 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
( J) A wards in similar cases. 
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(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
The Court has considered each of these factors and others in this case and has 
reviewed the detailed time records submitted by the personal representative's attorney. 
The hourly fees charged by the attorneys for the estate were consistent with the prevailing 
fees charged in the community. The personal representative requested that the Court 
award the amount of $2397.50 for fees incurred from March 25, 2014 through and 
including April 3, 2014 as a result of preparing for the trial scheduled on April 2, 2014 
and defending the Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will 
and Determining Heirs and the Petition for Order Restraining Personal Representative. 
The personal representative also requested that the Court award the amount of 
$8050.00 for fees incurred from April 23, 2104, the date Mr. Fleenor filed the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, through and including July 9, 2014 for having to defend that motion 
and the preparation of a motion and memorandum for attorney's fees and costs, for a total 
amount of$10,477.50. 
The Court, considering the factors of I.R.1P 54(e)(3) and others, has determined ~· ;../Vire 
that an award of attorney's fees in the amount of '1,l/l,V is appropriate. 
The Col orders that Thomas Lanham, Jr. to pay attorney's fees to the estate in 
o-• 
the amount of 1,oa:2 ,.... . 
Dated this 1 'f ~y of January 2015. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this_/!/_ iy o~ 
2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS to be served upon the individuals named below in the 
manner indicated: 











Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan 
SHELLY TILTON 
DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
Yfit~L0 Depclerk 
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Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: {208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: {208) 365-1646 
'-"' F I A.k ~. 
FEB 1 2 2015 
~~ 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 









CASE NO. CV2013-886 
AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
Your Affiant, NANCY L. CALLAHAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. That your Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for the above named 
Defendant and has personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein; 
2. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference, is a true and correct copy of Defendant's attorney fee and 
cost billing incurred in this matter that relate to the Appeal filed by 
Thomas Everett Lanham and the Motion to Dismiss filed on January 
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14, 2015. The charges set forth on Exhibit "A" were incurred by the 
estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham from Defendant from November 26, 
2014 when the Appellant's Brief was served and through and including 
January 21, 2015 as and for fees related to above referenced filings in 
the total sum of $23,957.50 and $132.00 for 22 pages at $6.00 per 
page for total costs and fees of $24,089.50. 
3. Your Affiant is an attorney duly licensed and practicing in the State of 
Idaho with offices located at 101 Canal Street, Emmett, Idaho, and is 
the attorney for the Personal Representative and respondent. 
4. Your Affiant has represented the personal representative upon an 
agreed hourly rate of $175.00 per hour in .2 increments of an hour. 
Your Affiant has reviewed the attached Exhibit "A" of attorney fees and 
costs incurred by the estate and believes that the charges reflected on 
Exhibit "A" are reasonable for representation in this matter. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me the undersigned Notary 
Public in~'d1-"l'Wt11iJl State of Idaho on this ~day of February 2015. 
-~'Yi:._i'- s.""'Poh~ 
~.J.. '?"'' .. - ......... ::! >~ 
/)1 NOTAR ·,~\ l L-\ l.v...__ S · Ooa::t::._.__ 
ii ( Y \ ~ Notary;ubflc for the State of Idaho 
~ \ -·- i ~ Residing at: ~'-'EJI , Idaho 
\ -~'··· Puauc ,.../ / Commission Expires: s /:z.9 l"ZAla,, 
~"}::'·· ... 0 ~ ~ ~~~ ............. "'~ ~ 
~./~OF \Or~~ 
71111111111111m"\''''l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this _!!!_-day of 
February 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing legal 
document to be served upon the following named individual in the manner 
indicated: 
[ ~FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
Patrick J. Geile 
Matthew G Bennett 
FOLEY FREEMAN 
Facsimile: (208) 888-5130 
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Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett 
ID 83617 
Nov-26/14 First reading: appellant's brief Oust received). 0.50 87.50 
Nancy scanned so I could write comments and 
notes on faxed hard copy. NLC &RMK 
Dec 1/14 Read and bei:ain research issues raised in 0.70 122.50 
Appellant's Brief' filed by Pat Geile and Matt Bennett, 
Foley, Freeman. Telephone call from Judd. 
Dec 3/14 email from Cathy, telephone call from Judd, 4.90 857.50 
review summary judgment file. Research. NLC 
Dec 3/14 Read through brief, again, short skim of Law 0.60 105.00 
Review article on partial wills, prepare 
CD for copying GT audio from Judd. RMK 
Dec 4/14 Research continued review of Appellant's 4.50 787.50 
case law. NLC 
Dec 4/14 Read through Will. Copy Master audio CD RMK. 1.00 175.00 
Dec 5/14 Research: unintended trusts? (Other than 2.30 402.50 
constructive trusts created as judicial remedy) RMK 
Dec 7/14 Continued review of case law, review LR. articles 3.50 612.50 
concerning negative wills NLC. 
Dec 8/14 Work on Research and law review articles NLC 4.00 700.00 
Dec 9/14 NLC Continue with case law cited by Appellant 2.00 350.00 
Dec 10/14 Continued review of case law and law review 3.00 525.00 
articles. NLC 
Dec 11/14 Continued review of case law and law review 3.40 595.00 
articles. NLC 
Dec 15/14 Research. Hedlin v. Westdala 3.40 595.00 
Lutheran Church. Melton v. Stssel. RMK 
Dec 15/14 Continue research. NLC 3.50 612.50 
Dec 16/14 Continue research. NLC 5.00 
Dec 16/14 Listening to Audio disks. reading law review 2.80 490.00 
material. Case law Idaho and national power of 
appointment doctrine. RMK 
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- Law Offices of Nancy t::"'Callahan 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett 
ID 83617 
Date INIT. DescriQtion of Service Hours Amount 
Dec 17/14 research RMK 0.60 105.00 
Dec 18/14 Research and work on outline NLC. 4.60 805.00 
Dec 18/14 Reading law review materials. Hirsch, Adam J. 4.60 
"Incomplete Wills," 111 Michigan LRev. 1423 
(2013). Brainstorming with Nancy. RMK 
Dec 19/14 Continue with brief NLC. 2.50 437.50 
Dec21/14 More study of law review articles. 4.10 717.50 
draft Motion to Extend Time for Filing 
Respondent's Brief and Affidavit. Attempt to 
contact opposing counsel. RMK 
Dec22/14 Finish Motion to Extend Time for Filing 4.30 752.50 
Respondent's Brief ad Affidavit. Proposed Order. 
Research - collecting pertinent legal quotations. RMK 
Dec 23/14 SOME MORE LAW REVIEWS:The Power of 3.20 560.00 
Appointment: Tool of Estate Planning and 
Drafting. Bolich, W. Bryan. RMK 
Dec 29/14 Web searching for more Law Review articles; 2.60 455.00 
reading same. RMK 
Dec 30/14 More law review articles. Review all the affidavits 2.00 350.00 
filed. 
Jan 4/15 RMK Going through record. Organizing, scanning, 2.50 437.50 
to continue work at home later. 
More law reviews-these from Nancy. 
Jan 5/15 Reading and taking notes on cases. RMK 3.30 577.50 
Jan 5/15 Continue working on statement of the case.NLC 2.50 437.50 
Jan 6/15 Outlining, law review research (mostly negative 1.70 297.50 
wills-disinheritance today), and gathering quotes 
of cases and secondary sources. RMK 
Jan 7/15 Work on brief, statement of the case. NLC 2.50 437.50 
Jan 8/15 Research - specifically concerning disinheritance 4.30 752.50 
in wills ruled to be partially invalid or to leave 
some property to pass by intestate succession. 
(until 8:20 pm) RMK 
Jan 8/15 Continue working on first draft. NLC 3.00 525.00 
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Emmett 
ID 83617 
Jan 9/15 Continued research - specifically concerning 4.90 857.50 
disinheritance in wills ruled to be partially invalid 
or to leave some property to pass by intestate 
succession. Switched after noticing appeal may 
have been filed late. Researching potential 
defenses to timeliness issue. RMK 
Jan 10/15 Work on Motion (and/or stipulation) to Dismiss 3.50 612.50 
Appeal. Anticipating defenses to untimeliness 
and gathering text in preparation to call Judd. 
Telephone call to Judd. Needs time to think 
about the issues of fees and costs (upon which we 
must agree if there is to be a stipulation to 
dismiss.) RMK &NLC 
Jan 11/15 Notes on detailed analysis App. Brief RMK 1.20 210.00 
Jan 12/15 More research into dismissal of appeals from 2.90 507.50 
magistrate division. Call to Foley, Freeman. 
Message left. Telephone call with Judd. Call 
returned from of Foley Freeman (4:40pm). Pat 
Geile is out with a sick kid. Proposes a 
teleconference at 10:30 tomorrow. 
.: Calendared. Sounds like they will take the 
position the motion to reconsider tolled the time 
for filing an appeal, so no stip about dismissal. 
Probably willing to stipulate to give us more time 
to file brief. RMK & NLC 
Jan 13/15 More research on issues related to dismissal. 4.60 805.00 
Preparation for scheduled teleconference at 
10:30. Conference call came at 11:15 ("sorry got 
tied up on another call"). Matt spoke. Said 
Patrick Geile was present, too, but heard nothing 
from him. They will not stipulate to a dismissal. 
"Send us your motion and a letter proposing 
whatever extension of time you want." Finished 
motion and memorandum and printed out for 
Nancy to read in the morning. RMK & NLC 
Jan 14/15 Making edits with benefit of Nancy's 2.70 472.50 
proof-reading. Confer with Nancy and added 
section about fees and costs on appeal. Serve 
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101 Canal Street 
Emmett 
ID 83617 
Nancy and I spoke with opposing counsel (Matt 
Bennett). Some research concerning case law 
pertinent to timeliness of appeal, based on what 
Bender said. 'We found a couple cases that said 
the motion for reconsideration tolled time limit.") 
(0.4 hr.) Return to working on Respondent's 
Brief. Interrupted when Appellant's response to 
dismiss came over fax about 3:00 pm. I already 
had found the two cases cited. Start Reply to 
App.'s response to motion to dismiss. RMK &NLC 
Work on Reply to App's Response to Motion to 
Dismiss and research related to appeal brief (in 
Boise). RMK 
Writing Reply on dismissal of appeal issue. Print 
for Nancy to edit in morning. RMK 
Incorporate Nancy's suggestions into reply. 
Another Motion for extension of time to file 
Respondent's Brief. RMK 
Final Edits on Extension with Nancy's edits. 
Fax.file and fax-serve Reply, Second Motion for 
Extension, 2 cover sheets. File originals with 
local clerk. RMK & NLC 
NLC Review and editing Reply to motion to dismi 


















Patrick J. Geile, ISB No. 6975 
Matthew G. Bennett, ISB No. 9499 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC 
953 S. Industry Way 
P.O. Box 10 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased.' 





Case No. CV-2013-886 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, JUDD LANHAM, AND HIS 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD.NANCY L. CALLAHAN AND ROLF M. KEHNE LOCATED AT 
101 CANAL STREET, EMMETT, ID 83617. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
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1. The above named Appellant, Thomas E. Lanham, appeals against the above 
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Dismissing Appeal entered 
in the above entitled action on the 10th day of February, 2015, the Honorable Judge Duff 
McKee presiding. 
2. That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 11 I.A.R. 
3. This appeal is taken from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Gem 
County bearing case number CV 2013-886. 
4. This appeal is taken upon a matter of law, most specifically whether a 
premature motion for reconsideration is nonetheless timely for purposes of tolling the 
appeals period contained in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(e). 
5. No recording or transcript exists as there was no hearing on this matter. The 
Honorable Duff McKee's decision was based on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss as 
untimely Filed and Memorandum in Support Motion for Fees and Costs on Appeal filed 
January 14, 2015, Petitioner's Response to Motion To Dismiss filed January 16, 2015, 
Respondent's Reply Re: Dismissal of Appeal filed January 20, 2015, and the record on file 
in this case; 
6. The issues on appeal will be: 
(a) Whether a motion to reconsider filed after a hearing on summary 
judgment where the judge ruled from the bench that he was granting 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, but before the written 
judgment was entered is nonetheless timely for purposes of tolling the 
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appeals period contained in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(e). 
(b) Whether the Judgment entered June 25, 2014 is a valid Judgment 
within the meaning of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a). 
(c) Whether The Order Dismissing Appeal is a valid judgment within the 
meaning of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a). 
(d) Plaintiff reserves the right to add or amend the issues on appeal. 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2015. 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC ~ .... 
By·Afll~ ~ 
·~nett 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND PAYMENT 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the appellate filing fee has been paid and that no 
preparation of a transcript or record is required. I further certify that on the '2.o'!:J- day of 
March, 2015, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Nancy L. Callahan 
Rolf M. Kehne 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
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Patrick J. Geile, ISB No. 6975 
Matthew G. Bennett, ISB No. 9499 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC 
953 S. Industry Way 
P.O. Box 10 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 





Case No. CV-2013-886 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, JUDD LANHAM, AND HIS 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD NANCY L. CALLAHAN AND ROLF M. KEHNE LOCATED AT 
101 CANAL STREET, EMMETI, ID 83617. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
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1. The above named Appellant, Thomas E. Lanham, appeals against the above 
named Respondent to the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Gem County from a Memorandum Decision on Personal Representative's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs entered in the above entitled action on the 19th day of 
February, 2015, the Honorable Tyler D. Smith presiding. 
2. That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho District Court, and the 
judgment or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 11 I.A.R. 
3. This appeal is taken from the Magistrate Division of the Idaho District Court of 
the Third Judicial District, Gem County and bears case number CV 2013-886. 
4. This appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law, most specifically whether 
an award of attorney's fees is appropriate where the underlying case is being appealed and 
2) whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees in the 
amount of $9,000.00. 
5. No recording or transcript exists as there was no hearing on this matter. 
However, there are court transcripts for the underlying proceedings. The Honorable Tyler 
D. Smith's decision was based on Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed 
July 9, 2014, Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs filed July 9, 2014, Respondent's Affidavit in Support of Motion of Attorney's Fees 
and Costs filed July 9, 2014, and Appellant's Objection to Motion for Attorney Fees and 
Costs filed July 31, 2014, and the record on file in this case. 
6. The issues on appeal will be: 
(a) Whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate where the 
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underlying case is currently being appealed 
{b) Whether the Memorandum Decision on Personal Representative's 
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Judgment entered June 25, 2014 
is a valid and enforceable judgment within the meaning of Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54{a). 
{c) Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in awarding 
$9,000.00 in attorney's fees against the Appellant. 
(d) Plaintiff reserves the right to add or amend the issues on appeal. 
DATED this 2of4;;) day of March, 2015. 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC 
By: _/Z1._M..._a~~he . . ... w-G.~~~-tt - :J,,.-+-----
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of March, 2015, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Nancy L. Callahan 
Rolf M. Kehne 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
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l ORDER ON RESPONDENTS REQUEST 











This matter is before the court on Respondent's Request for Attorney Fees and Costs on 
appeal and as associated with the Motion to Dismiss the appeal. 
Procedural History 
On June 25, 2014, the Decision and Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
was filed. On August 13, 2014, forty-nine ( 49) days later, the Appellant filed his Notice of 
Appeal. On November 26, 2014, the Appellant filed the Appellant's Brief. On December 22, 
2014, the Respondent filed a Motion to Extend Time for Filing Respondent's Brief. On January 
14, 2015, the Respondent filed the Motion to Dismiss Appeal a.s Untimely Filed. On February 
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l 0, 2015 this court entered the Order Dismissing Appeal. On Febrnary 12, 2015, the Respondent 
filed a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Costs. On 
February 20, 2015, the Appellant filed an Objection to Memorandum Request for Costs and 
Attorney Fees. The court has determined that there is no need for oral argument on this motion. 
Analysis 
The Respondent seeks attorney fees and costs incurred during this appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 and 41. The Respondent seeks $132.00 in costs, and $23,957.50 in 
attorney fees. The Appellant objects to the request on the grounds that the Respondent ha-; not 
sought fees under the proper rule, but that even if the court finds that fees and costs are 
warranted the requested fees are exorbitant. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a) provides that costs, on appeal, shall be awarded to the 
prevailing party "unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." Idaho Appellate Rule 
41(a) provides that "any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must assert such a claim ... in the 
first appellate brief filed by such party ... ,. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41 is not authority for the awarding of attorney fees." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 
Idaho 364, 369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). Rather, this rule requires a party, on appeal, to 
"include that claim as an issue or additional issue on appeal, and the party must 'state the basis 
for the claim.' ltL As was correctly argued by the Appellant, the Respondent did not file an 
appellate brief and thus, a claim for attorney fees on appeal was not properly sought pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41. 
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However, although the Respondent did not seek fees pursuant to any other rule, the court 
will consider the request pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(x) and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d) and (e). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(x) provides that on an appeal from the magistrate 
division to the district court that "[a]ny appellate procedure not specified or covered by these 
rules shall be in accordance with the appropriate rule of the LR.C.P." Thus, this court turns to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l) (costs may be awarded to prevailing party) and 
54(e)(l)(attorney fees may be awarded to prevailing party). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l )(B) provides that in determining the prevailing party, the court is to consider "the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." 
In this matter, the only issue decided by the court on appeal was the decision granting the 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the untimely filed appeal. The court finds that the Respondent 
was the prevailing party on that motion and is entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred as a 
result of filing that motion. It is unclear to the com1 why the Motion to Dismiss the appeal was 
filed was filed approximately five months afte.r the filing of the Notice of Appeal, and after 
significant time was undertaken by both parties. However, the Respondent was the prevailing 
party on that motion and is entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred for the preparation and 
prosecution of that motion. 
The respondent seeks attorney fees of $23,957.50 and costs of $132.00. The costs appear 
to be based upon copying the respondent's brief on appeal at $6.00 per page, which is the rate 
allowed by the appellate rules for printing appellate briefs. I.AR. 40. This cost is allowed. 
The attorney fees appear to include all attorney time posted to this matter after the notice 
of appeal. A huge amount of the time appears to be for research into the substantive issues 
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raised. Apparently, counsel overlooked the jurisdictional issue until well into the research on 
other issues. In fairness, once the jurisdictional issue surfaced, the result became obvious. It 
appears that two attorneys are involved in the case, with joint conferences, and joint involvement 
in writing and revising written materials. 
Respondent is only entitled to attorney fees for the motion and briefs filed on the motion 
to dismiss. The issue turned on a rudimentary rule with very few exceptions or varialions. A 
thorough brief on this issue could be produced from scratch in a few hours. The only wrinkle was 
the question of whether a motion to reconsider an oral ruling that was later replaced by a written 
decision could operate to toll anything. While counsel may be entitled to time for thought, this 
issue could not have required much more than a brief pause. Also, although l have no criticism 
of the fact that respondent had two attorneys on this issue, the issues here merited only one 
attorney on the task. For all these reasons, I conclude that the time claimed here is excessive of 
what is reasonably allowable, or what may reasonably be charged against the non-prevailing 
party. 
This this case, the court has considered all factors under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(e)(3) in conjunction with the memorandum and affidavit provided by counsel for the 
Respondent Having considered all factors, and in exercising the discretion provided to the 
court, I will allow 4.0 hours general attorney time for case and file administration, routine 
communications, teleconferences with opposition, and other matters ancillary to the effort on the 
motion and file; 8.0 hours of attorney time, one attorney only, for the preparation of the motion 
and brief; 4.0 attorney time to review the response brief and research the issues for the reply 
brief; and 8.0 hours to draft and edit the reply brief. 24.0 hours total at $175 per hour is 
$4,200.00, which 1 will allow as attorney fees in this matter. 
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Conclusion and Order 
For the foregoing rea'ions expressed above, the court finds and orders that the Respondenl 
is entitled to costs on appeal in the amount of $132.00, and is entitled to attorney fees incurred as 
result of the Motion to Dismiss the appeal in the amount of $4,200.00. 
Dated thisd day of March 2015. 
D. Duff McKee, Senior District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-~ 
The undersigned certifies that o~ _¢;._) ( day of March, 2015, s/he served a true and correct copy 
of the original of the foregoing~ on the following individuals in the manner described: 
• upon counsel for appellant: 
Patrick J. GeiJe 
Matthew G. Bennett 
953 S. Industry Way 
P.O. Box. 10 
Meridian, ID 83680 
• upon counsel for defendant: 
Nancy L Callahan 
Rolf M. Kehne 
l O l Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient 
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
~nelly Tilton 
Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) SUPREMECOURTNO. 43105 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) 





JUDD LANHAM, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
I, SHELLY TILTON, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true, full and correct 
Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including all 
documents filed or lodged as requested in the Notice of Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court 
at Emmett, Idaho, this 16th day of June, 2015. 
SHELLY TILTON 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 43105 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
) 








I, SHELLY TILTON, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify: 
That there were no exhibits which were offered or admitted into evidence during the course 
of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court at Emmett, Idaho this 16th day of June, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
SHELLY TILTON 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 43105 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) 





ruoD LANHAM, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
I, Shelly Tilton, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify that I personally mailed, by United States 
Mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their 
Attorney of Record as follows: 
Attorney for Appellant 
Patrick J. Geile 
Matthew G. Bennett 
FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC 
953 S. Industry Way 
PO Box 10 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Attorney for Respondent 
Nancy L. Callahan 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Attorney at Law 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett,ID 83617 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 16th day of June, 2014. 
SHELLY TILTON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
